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NORTH DAKOTA SUPREME COURT
1962-1964
It has long been the hope of the Review to gather within its
pages a brief survey of the decisions of the Supreme Court of North
Dakota on a regular basis, as a service to the busy practitioner.
With this issue we begin the first biennial examination of the court's
recent cases.
As the case load of the court is small, ranging from sixty-five
to seventy-five a year, we decided to cover a two year period-from
the September Term, 1962 to the June Term, 1964. Cases were
selected on the basis of the newness of the points discussed and
their adaptability to analysis. In instances where the court has
adopted the law of other states without extensive discussion, we
have limited our examination to the holding and a brief comment;
but where the issues are both novel and difficult, we have given them
more detailed treatment. For the purpose of completeness we
have re-examined leading North Dakota cases previously treated in
these pages.
Owing to the size of the undertaking, the entire staff joined in
the effort, and the final draft was the product of many minds. Time,
and the proximity of semester examinations, did not permit us to
compile a statistical analysis of the work of the court, but we expect
that this valuable feature will become a regular part of future
surveys.
In such an experimental venture, we welcome and invite the
criticisms of our readers, that we may improve on our efforts to
serve the Bench and Bar of North Dakota.
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
Revocation of a Common Motor Carrier Certificate for the
Abandonment of Service-Section 49-18-17 of the Century Code pro-
vides that a common motor carrier may not discontinue or abandon
service without an order of the Public Service Commission. The
basic purpose of this statute is to protect the safety and welfare
of the public. The question in Fargo Freight Truck v. North Dakota
Pub. Serv. Comm'n1 was whether the appellant had "discontinued"
1. Fargo Freight Truck v. North Dakota Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 129 N.W.2d 368 (N.D.
1964).
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or "abandoned" service to the public by leasing all of its equipment
to another common carrier.
The Supreme Court held that these acts constituted an abandon-
ment and discontinuance that justified the action of the Public
Service Commission in revoking the common motor carrier certifi-
cate of the appellants. The court reasoned that the statute demanded
that the public be served by the certificate holder, not the lessee.
2
Although the motor carrier strongly urged that the public interest
was not adversely affected, the court concluded that the violation
of public laws adversely affect the public interest.
Perhaps this strict application of the statute is not necessary to
effectuate its basic purpose. Cannot the public interest be served
by a lessee just as well as by the certificate holder? Does the public
really care who is serving them as long as they are effectually
being served?
CIVIL PROCEDURE
Appeal of Order on Motion to Dismiss-City of Minot v. Minot
Highway Center, Inc.3 and Nordenstrom v. Swedberg,4 were both
concerned with the appealability of an order to dismiss or a refusal
to give such an order.
In the Minot case, the defendant, though not named a party
thereto, appeared and answered in an eminent domain action, claim-
ing a leasehold interest in the condemned property. The plaintiff's
motion for involuntary dismissal was granted orally under rule 41 (b)
of the North Dakota Rules of Civil Procedure because the trial court
found, as a matter of law, that since the defendant had cancelled
his lease to the condemned property prior to the condemnation, he
had neither a right to relief nor had he shown any damage. Rule
41 (b) allows the granting of a motion for dismissal on the ground
that upon the facts and the law the other party has shown no right
to relief. The defendant contended on appeal that under section
28-27-02 of the Century Code there must be a right to appeal as the
order made a determination on the merits, to wit: determination
of his leasehold interest, and that the order was the equivalent of
a grant of a directed verdict.
The Supreme Court first answered that as the only function of
a jury in eminent domain is to assess damages, the attempted
analogy to a directed verdict must fail. Secondly, since the trial
court did not, as required under rule 52(a), specially find facts,
separately state its conclusions of law, and direct the entry of
2. N.D. Cent. Code § 48-18-17 (1960).
3. 120 N.W.2d 597 (N.D. 1963).
4. 123 N.W.2d 285 (N.D. 1963).
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judgment on the order, the order was not reviewable under the rule
established in the Burdick case. 5 "Nonappealable orders may be
reviewed upon an appeal from the judgment where such orders and
the facts essential to their review are embodied in a settled statement
of the case, which is made part of the record on appeal."
In Nordenstrom, the defendant raised the affirmative defense
that the contract in question called for submitting any dispute there-
under to arbitration, which action had not been taken, and, on this
ground, moved for dismissal. This motion was denied, and from
that order appeal was taken. The Supreme Court held that under
section 28-27-02 of the Century Code, an order which involves the
merits of an action (and is therefore appealable) embraces those
orders which pass on the substantial legal rights of the party
requesting it. The defendant contended that a substantial right had
been denied, to wit: arbitration. But the court said that an order
which leaves the point involved undetermined does not involve the
merits. This order denying the motion to dismiss is not decisive of
the question involved, nor does it prejudice the defendant's right to
raise the question at a subsequent stage of the proceedings. Neither
an order dismissing an action without prejudice nor an order denying
a motion for dismissal of the action is therefore appealable.
Change of Venue-When Motion is Uncontested-in Barkman v.
Quam,6 an action arising out of an automobile accident, the defend-
ant moved for an order for a change of venue to the court in which
county the accident occurred on the ground of the convenience of
the witnesses. The motion was supported by affidavits. All parties
to the action were present by counsel at the hearing on this motion.
None of them submitted counter affidavits showing prejudice or
inconvenience. Nevertheless, the court entered an order denying the
motion, from which this appeal was taken. The Supreme Court first
cited section 28-04-07 (3) of the Century Code which provides for a
change of venue on the ground of the convenience of witnesses and
then considered the duty of the court to whose sound discretion
such a motion is addressed.7 The court held that where the evidence
offered by the proponent is clear and unconflicting and where there
is no showing by the other parties of prejudice or inconvenience if
such motion were granted, refusal to grant such motion is an abuse
of discretion.
Undertaking on Appeal Does Not Confer Jurisdiction-The de-
fendant in In re Guardianship of Frank,8 filed a motion to dismiss
5. Burdick v. Mann, 59 N.D. 611, 231 N.W. 545 (1930). Syllabus by the court.
6. 123 N.W.2d 824 (N.D. 1963).
7. See Gessner v. Benson, 79 N.W.2d 152 (N.D. 1956).
8. 128 N.W.2d 355 (N.D. 1964).
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the appeal to the Supreme Court two days after the expiration of the
time for appeal. The ground for the motion was that the undertaking
had not been executed by two sureties as required by section 28-27-09
of the Century Code. Plaintiff moved for permission to substitute
cash in lieu of the undertaking pursuant to section 28-27-26 on the
following day. To this, the defendant objected that the time for
appeal had expired, and that as a result, the Supreme Court had no
jurisdiction to grant such leave. The court granted the motion of
the plaintiff, relying upon the rationale of Gamble Robinson Minot
Co. v. Maurates. The Gamble case involved a situation in which
the appellant did substitute cash in lieu of undertaking before the
time for appeal had run but failed to notify appellee of that fact.
In granting the plaintiff's motion, the Supreme Court quoted from
Gamble as the basis of its decision: "The service of an undertaking
on appeal is not jurisdictional. The notice of appeal, if served in
good faith, confers jurisdiction and, thereafter the court. . .may
permit the appeal to be perfected by providing the requisite under-
taking."' 10 It is apparent that the object of an undertaking on appeal
is for the protection of the appellee and that his only right is to
demand it, not to use failure of it as a basis for dismissal.
Motion to Remand to County Court to Perfect Appeal-The
administratrix of an estate appealed an order of the County Court
allowing a claim against the estate. Upon objection by the claimant
that the heirs at law had not been served with a notice of appeal,
the administratrix moved the District Court for an order to remand
the record to the County Court for the purpose of extending the
time for perfecting the appeal and for the purpose of serving the
additional parties. This motion was granted by the District Court,
and an appeal to the Supreme Court from this order was taken. 1
In the interim between the filing of the appeal and the order
under consideration, the administratrix filed a motion in the County
Court for an extension of time in which to perfect the appeal.
Upon denial, the claimant contended that since the County Court
had denied this motion, the District Court had no jurisdiction to
grant the order for remand under the authority of In re Bratcher.12
In that case, the County Court denied the motion to remand in the
exercise of its discretion on the merits. The Supreme Court distin-
guished the instant case wherein the County Court denied the motion
"because it felt it no longer had jurisdiction,' ' 13 and as the county
court had no jurisdiction, it was as if no application had been made
to it.
9. 55 N.D. 616, 214 N.W. 913 (1927).
10. Id. at 620, 214 N.W. at 915.
11. In re Fettig's Estate, 129 N.W.2d 823 (N.D. 1964).
12. In re Bratcher's Estate, 76 N.D. 194, 34 N.W.2d 825 (1948).
13. In re Fettig's Estate, 129 N.W.2d 823, 826 (N.D. 1964).
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The order to remand is an order made in the progress of the
cause requiring something to be done but not determining the con-
troversy. The right to appeal is statutory, and an order, to be
appealable, must involve the merits of the action.1 The effect of
such an order is to leave the action for the determination in the
District Court when the amended and supplemented record is
certified.
COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS
Conditional Sales-Foreclosure-Upon default of the purchaser,
may a conditional seller elect to foreclose by action a lien on personal
property sold under a conditional sales contract, seize the property
for the purpose of the foreclosure, and secure a personal judgment
for any deficiency? The Supreme Court faced this precise issue
recently in a case of first impression. In Massey-Ferguson, Inc. v.
Pfeiffle 5 the vendor of a combine under a conditional sales contract
brought an action for foreclosure and deficiency judgment. Defend-
ant vendee contended that seizure of the combine by warrant of
attachment under the foreclosure proceeding amounted to a re-
possession by the vendor and constituted an election of remedies,
barring the vendor from suing on the debt, and therefore no personal
judgment for the deficiency was permissible. 6 Rejecting this
contention the court held that where a conditional contract provides
for liability of the purchaser for a deficiency and on default of the
purchaser the contract is foreclosed by action under chapter 32-20 of
the Century Code, and the property sells for less than the balance
due on the contract, plus costs, personal judgment for the deficiency
may be entered against the defendant, provided he has been
personally served with the summons.
Rescission-Two recent Supreme Court decisions have discussed
the equitable remedy of rescission. American Life & Casualty Ins.
Co. v. Otis Hann Co.17 involved an action for rescission of a contract
whereunder defendant was to perform certain services in attempting
to convert plaintiff's predecessor from a benevolent society into a
legal reserve life company. Plaintiff's predecessor had negotiated
the contract in 1947. In 1949 plaintiff's predecessor sued for rescission
of the contract on the ground of false and fraudulent representation.
This action was compromised in 1950 with a stipulation that the
1947 contract was in all things ratified and confirmed, except for
certain changes specified in the stipulation. Defendant entered into
performance of the contract as amended but was advised by the
14. N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-27-02(5) (1960).
15. 124 N.W.2d 369 (N.D. 1963).
16. Pfeiffer v. Norman, 22 N.D. 168, 133 N.W. 97 (1911).
17. 124 N.W.2d 830 (N.D. 1963).
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president of plaintiff's predecessor to discontinue further work under
the contract in October, 1950. On December 31, 1951, plaintiff acquired
all of the assets and assumed all of the liabilities of its predecessor.
Although defendant was performing no services for the plaintiff
because of the October, 1950, notice to discontinue work, plaintiff's
predecessor and plaintiff continued to make regular payments to
defendant until 1954, when plaintiff commenced this action for
rescission. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding, that the plaintiff
was not entitled to rescission because of the defendant's failure to
perform services. The plaintiff's predecessor knew of the defendant's
inability to perform prior to the compromise of the earlier action.
He had instructed the defendant to cease performance and both he
and the plaintiff had continued to make payments under the agree-
ment for four years after such notice. The plaintiff therefore was
in noposition to complain.
Section 9-09-04 of the Century Code provides that the rescinding
party must act promptly upon discovering the facts which entitle
him to rescind, if he is free from duress, menace, undue influence,
or disability and is aware of his right to rescind. Since rescission is
an equitable remedy, what is or is not prompt action will depend
upon the circumstances of the individual case."8 Surely the trans-
piration of four years amply justified the court's conclusion that
laches existed in this instance.
The second case involving the remedy of rescission was Hummel
v. Kranz.19 Here, a husband and wife brought an action to rescind
working interest agreements they had entered into with defendants
concerning Canadian oil wells, on the ground that such agreements
were securities as defined by the Century Code,20 were not exempt
from the provisions of the State Securities Act, 21 and were never
registered with the Securities Commissioner of North Dakota as
required by the act. Each of the agreements in question was effected
in the presence of both husband and wife, and each agreement was
phrased "Received of Johnnie Jr. & or Claudia . . ." (Emphasis
added.) Defendants offered proof, which was contradictory to the
husband's testimony, that they had tendered a written offer of
rescission to the husband, but that he had refused to accept it and
argued that such offer absolved the defendants of any liability ac-
cording to the Century Code.2 2 Rejecting this contention, the court
held that the working interest agreements purchased were securities
subject to registration, 2 and that the sellers' presentation, to the
husband only, of an offer to refund the purchase price, if in fact
18. Annis v. Burnham, 15 N.D. 577, 108 N.W. 549 (1906).
19. 126 N.W.2d 786 (N.D. 1964).
20. N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-04-02 (1960).
21. N.D. CENT. CODE ch. 10-04 (1960).
22. N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-04-17 (1960).
23. N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-04-02 (1960).
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they made such an offer, did not effect rescission under the statute
or bind the buyers to the purchase. The court was of the opinion
that on equitable grounds, "& or" should be construed as and to
effect the intention of the parties; that this required that the offer
be presented to the wife too, and failure to do so made the offer
ineffectual.
Contracts-Construction-In Deizar Constr. Co. v. New Marian
Homes Corp.,' defendant, a subdivision developer, petitioned the
city of Bismarck for the installation of water and sewer facilities
in a residential housing development defendant proposed to under-
take. Pursuant thereto the city set up special improvement districts
and accepted bids on a unit price basis. Plaintiff was the successful
bidder. Before the contract was consummated between the city and
the plaintiff, the normal procedure whereunder the city would con-
tract with the successful bidder was modified, and the defendant
joined with the city in a contract with the plaintiff in which the
defendant agreed to pay for that portion of the work required to
serve its addition, and the city agreed to pay for "oversize" of the
systems necessary to serve other areas. The completed project
entailed rock excavation expenses of 8,000 dollars in excess of con-
tract specifications. Plaintiff brought suit to recover this amount,
contending that the contract was construable as a unit price contract,
the quantity of which was variable but the unit price unchangeable.
Defendant resisted, arguing that the contract provided for a fixed
sum, and counterclaimed for liquidated damages for delay. The
Supreme Court held that the contract was construable as a unit
price contract and not as a fixed sum contract, and that where the
contract provided for computable liquidated damages for delay and
no evidence was received in support thereof, recovery of such dam-
ages was not authorized.
The instant case adds nothing to what is already considered to
be well-established contract law, viz., that the object of construction
of a contract is to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the
parties; and to accomplish that purpose, the contract should be
construed as a whole, 2- and the surrounding circumstances from
which a contract stems should be considered. 26
Olson v. Brodel127 was a forcible entry and detainer action
involving an option to purchase half interest in a farm. In November
of 1956 plaintiff purchased the land from defendant's father, and,
in conjunction with the purchase, plaintiff leased a one-half interest
24. 117 N.W.2d 851 (N.D. 1962).
25. N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-07-06 (1960); Larson v. Wood, 75 N.D. 9, 25 N.W.2d 100
(1946).
26. N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-07-12 (1960); Ireland v. Charlesworth, 98 N.W.2d 224 (N.D.
1959).
27. 128 N.W.2d 169 (N.D. 1964).
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in the operation and income of the property to defendant. In addition
to the lease the parties executed an option to purchase, the second
paragraph of which contained a provision for installment payments
should the option be exercised. At the trial plaintiff offered evidence
that as originally drawn the option to purchase agreement contained
no provision for installment payments, and that such provision was
inserted into the agreement at a later date without his approval.
Since this allegation was in conflict with the testimony adduced by
the defendant, the Supreme Court left undisturbed the trial court's
finding for the defendant on this count. On April 12, 1960, a second
lease covering the years of 1960 and 1961 was executed which re-
affirmed the option to purchase for the period of the lease. Defend-
ants made payments under the option to purchase in the years
1960-1962, but plaintiff refused to accept them, contending that the
option had terminated in 1961 without having been acted upon by
the defendant. Subsequently, plaintiff commenced this action seeking
to evict the defendant from the premises. The trial court found
that the defendant was not entitled to possession of the land, but
that he should be permitted to make payment in full of the purchase
price of a one-half interest in the land, extending the time for
payment to May 1, 1963. Defendant then conveyed his interest to
an assignee who made payment of the balance of the purchase price
within the prescribed time. On appeal the plaintiff contended, inter
alia, that the trial court had made a new contract when it found
that the provisions of the contract included a prepayment clause
permitting the payment of the entire purchase price, and that the
option to purchase was not assignable. Rejecting both contentions,
the Supreme Court held that the provision that the payment should
be made "on or before November 1 of each year" was properly
construed to permit prepayment, and when the defendant exercised
his option to purchase, the option became an assignable contract . 2
Alm Constr. Co. v. Vertin2 9 was an action by a contractor to
recover the balance due on a construction contract together with an
amount allegedly due for extra work. The building owner counter-
claimed for defective materials and workmanship. Following an
adverse judgment of the trial court, defendant owner appealed to
the Supreme Court which held that a new trial was required.
Although a number of issues were before the court, the basic
question concerned the effect of a failure to include building
specifications within the consummated contract. Prior to the exe-
cution of the contract, defendant had negotiated with the National
Tea Company for a lease of the building and parking lot to be
constructed. National was to provide specifications for the proposed
28. Semmler v. Beulah "Coal Mining Co., 48 N.D. 1011, 188 N.W. 310 (1922).
29. 118 N.W.2d 737 (N.D. 1962).
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construction and, in general, superintend the work. National sub-
mitted its specifications to the defendant, and, thereafter, a
representative of National met with plaintiff and defendant for
preliminary negotiations. No contract resulted at this time, however,
since National desired a larger parking area than defendant could
provide. Later National agreed to accept defendant's proposal, and
plaintiff and defendant concluded the contract. No further specifi-
cations were submitted by National, and defendant interpreted
plaintiff's offer as an offer to construct a building conforming to the
specifications she had received from National prior to the preliminary
negotiations. These specifications differed in several material
respects from the building which was constructed. During the course
of construction, plaintiff worked closely with representatives of
National who approved the building, but, nonetheless, plaintiff did
not adhere to the specifications originally submitted. Near the
completion of the project, plaintiff and a representative of National
drew a set of specifications which conformed to the building as it
was then being constructed. These specifications were admitted in
evidence at the trial, but the specifications which defendant had
received earlier from National were excluded. In passing upon this
particular issue the Supreme Court held that it was error for the
trial court to exclude the evidence proffered by the defendant.
Where the contract is written, the intention of the parties must,
if possible, be ascertained from the writing alone.80 Where a contract
is ambiguous, however, and it is impossible to ascertain the intention
of the -parties from the writing alone, it is proper to search for its
true meaning by reference to the circumstances under which it was
made and the matter to which it relates.3 1 When a written construc-
tion contract refers to specifications that are not annexed or other-
wise identified and two sets of specifications are offered in evidence,
it is for the jury to determine which one is the set of specifications
referred to.8 2
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Grant of a Big Game License to a Property Owner is a
Reasonable Classification-The defendant was convicted of misrepre-
sentation in the application for a hunting license in which he stated
that he had not received a hunting license for the hunting of antelope
during the past four years, when in fact, he had. Upon trial of the
issue, the court found the defendant guilty, but gave an order in
arrest of judgment on the grounds that the statute, for violation of
30. N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-07-04 (1960).
31. N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-07-12 (1960); Battagler v. Dickson, 76 N.D. 641, 38 N.W.2d
720 (1949).
32. Cook v. IAttlefield, 98 Me. 299, 56 A. 899 (1903).
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which defendant was convicted, was unconstitutional in that it did
not treat all citizens and residents of North Dakota equally; and
that it was so uncertain as to be void. The trial court said that the
statute provided that an owner or operator within the unit does
not have to submit to a lottery to obtain a license but may obtain
such a license every year, while all others must submit to a lottery
and may not hold a license more than once in four years. The court
went on to say that this created an unreasonable classification and
discriminated against those who did not own property because owner-
ship of property did not have any substantial relation to the purpose
of the act.33 It also held the word "operator" as used in the act
was indefinite.
In construing the statute on appeal34 the supreme court said that
any classification provided as the basis for special operation of the
law must be natural and "It must stand on some reason having re-
gard to the character of the legislation."35 It was reasonable that big
game could not be preserved without the cooperation of those upon
whose lands the game lived, and the privilege was "undoubtedly
intended as an inducement to farm and ranch operators to cooperate
in the preservation and conservation of game for the benefit of all
the people of the state."386 The statute did not fail for reason of
indefiniteness because the word "operators" must be construed to
refer to resident operators of farmstead units which provide habitat
for the big game involved. With this construction, those people who
are in a position to cooperate in the preservation of the game, may
be given preference as concerns hunting licenses.
Allocation of Funds by the Emergency Commission-Backman
v. Guy 7 involved a certification of questions of law to the Supreme
Court as to whether the Emergency Commission may allocate funds
for a new purpose. A new purpose is one neither covered by, nor
included within, a current legislative appropriation, either due to
consideration and denial by the legislature, veto by the governor,
or lack of consideration by the legislature. The Supreme Court
found that it was not so authorized, and then set out explicit guidelines
under which the Emergency Commission could authorize the with-
drawal of monies from the state treasury to meet an emergency
until such time as the Legislative Assembly could make an
appropriation.
The function to be performed by the department receiving the
emergency appropriation must be within the purposes of existing
appropriations. Unforeseen happenings which necessitate the emer-
33. N.D. CENT. CODE § 20-08-03 (1960).
34. State v. Miller, 129 N.W.2d 356 (N.D. 1964).
35. Edmonds v. Herbrandson, 2 N.D. 270, 50 N.W. 970 (1891).
36. State v. Miller, auyra note 34, at 364.
87. 126 N.W.2d 910 (N.D. '1964).
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gency appropriations must be within the area of the governmental
function for which an appropriation was made.
This, of course, was a proceeding under chapter 32-24 of the
Century Code, CERTIFICATION OF QUESTION OF LAW TO SUPREME
COURT. This chapter allows any county or district court, when the
cause at trial depends upon the construction of the law applicable
thereto, upon application of an attorney, to determine, settle,
adjudicate, and certify a distinct and formulated question of law to
the Supreme Court. Only so much of the record as is necessary to
illustrate the application of the formulated questions of law to the
issues involved need be forwarded. In the lower court, the question
arose in an attempt to enjoin such transfer and expenditure.
Presumably, the injunction will now issue in such a case.
Review of Petitions for Referendum-The Supreme Court ordered
the Secretary of State to show cause why it should not review the
Secretary's decision that certain petitions were sufficient to require
a referendum in accordance with section 25 of the Constitution of
North Dakota. On hearing, the Secretary of State contended that
such ballots had already been printed and that under section 25 of
the state constitution, the time for review had passed. The Supreme
Court, in Shore v. Meier,3 held that the language of section 25 of
the Constitution-"If the sufficiency of such petition is being reviewed
at the time the ballot is prepared, the Secretary of State shall place
the measure on the ballot and no subsequent decision shall invalidate
such measure if it is at such election approved by a majority of the
votes cast thereon"-must be construed to mean that "Once the
ballot is prepared the election must go on, no matter to what extent
the petitions to place the measures in the ballot may have been
insufficient." 39 The effect of this decision is simply to limit the
time during which such petitions may be objected to.
Remand from Federal Court Under Doctrine of Abstention-
Petitioners brought suit in the Federal District Court of North
Dakota for an injunction to prevent the Secretary of State of North
Dakota from holding elections to determine the membership of the
Legislative Assembly, contending that all districting and reapportion-
ment laws of the State of North Dakota were violative of the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment to the United States
Constitution. The District Court invoked, sua sponte, the doctrine
of abstention, retaining jurisdiction of the action, but staying all
proceedings in federal court pending the opportunity of the North
Dakota Supreme Court to pass upon the issues involved. In its
order invoking the doctrine of abstention, the District Court cited
Scholle v. Hare ° as precedent.
38. 122 N.W.2d 566 (N.D. 1963).
39. Id. at 568.
40. 369 U.S. 429 (1962).
256
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The North Dakota Supreme Court distinguished the case at bar
in that Scholle originated in the state courts rather than in the
federal courts and that the federal court in Scholle did not retain
jurisdiction in that case as did the federal court in the instant case.
The petitioners here had reserved their right to return to the Federal
District Court and had exposed the federal question to the state
court only because the Federal District Court had ordered this. The
North Dakota Supreme Court in State ex rel. Paulson v. Meier,4 1
held that since the federal court would have exclusive jurisdiction
of the subject matter of the action insofar as the federal question
was concerned, that it would employ the doctrine of comity and
refuse to hear the case. "The court that first acquires jurisdiction




Right to be Represented by Counsel-In State v. O'Neill43 the
petitioner, who pleaded guilty to grand larceny and robbery in the
first degree, was sentenced to prison. Before arraignment, the
accused was advised that it was his right to have counsel during
the proceedings, but he repeatedly told the court that he did not
want a lawyer. Because his waiver was freely and understandingly
made the court declared that the petitioner waived his right to
counsel. In North Dakota it is both a constitutional 4 and a statu-
tory45 right to have counsel. An accused must be informed by the
court of this right and be asked if he desires the aid of counsel before
his arraignment begins. Only when this right is properly waived
does the assistance of counsel no longer become a necessary element
of the court's jurisdiction to proceed to conviction and sentence.4 6
A valid waiver, however, must be freely, understandingly and
intelligently made, with evidence in the record proving this alle-
gation. 47 The defendant relied heavily on two North Dakota cases
in which each defendant pleaded guilty without the benefit of the
counsel they had previously waived.48 In both those cases the court
explained that, taking into consideration the general intelligence of
the defendants, they lacked any understanding of their waiver and
that as a result thereof their convictions were void. But here there
was no evidence of inducement or coercion, and the defendant's
responses were prompt and displayed an understanding of the
41. 127 N.W.2d 665 (N.D. 1964).
42. Id. at 671.
43. 117 N.W.2d 857 (N.D. 1962).
44. N.D. CONST. art. 1, § 13.
45. N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-13-03 (1960).
46. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
47. State v. Whiteman, 67 N.W.2d 599 (N.D. 1954); State v. Magrum, 76 N.D. 527,
38 N.W.2d 358 (1949).
48. Ibid.
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questions asked of him by the court. Thus, the court was sufficiently
justified in concluding that the defendant had freely and understand-
ingly waived his right to counsel.
Earnings Received from Prostitution-In North Dakota prosti-
tution is defined as "the offer or receiving of the body for sexual
intercourse for hire. . .or for indiscriminate sexual intercourse with-
out hire. ' '4 9 Any person who knowingly receives revenue from the
proceeds or earnings of a woman engaged in prostitution is also
guilty of a felony. 50 In State v.Govanf1 the defendant was convicted
of receiving proceeds from a woman engaged in prostitution, but he
claimed that he was unaware of the fact that the money received
from her came from prostitution. The jury was instructed that if
they were convinced the woman was a prostitute and that the
defendant knowingly accepted revenue from the proceeds of the
woman, they must find him guilty. The instructions made no mention
of the defendant's defense. The Supreme Court declared this to be
prejudicial error and reversed the trial court's decision.
The problem involved here was previously met in State v. Green
52
where the court declared that the failure of the trial judge to make
any reference to the defense interposed, was an omission misleading
to the .jury.
Restrictions on the Execution of Health Warrants-In North
Dakota all search warrants must be executed in the daytime, unless
the magistrate inserts a direction that it may be served at any
time.58 In State v. Govan5 4 eight police officers and an Assistant
Attorney General entered the defendant's home at two A. M. with
a "health warrant" which directed them to take an alleged prostitute
into custody for a physical examination.. Under this warrant they
proceeded to search the entire home for evidence to be used against
the defendant, who was accused of receiving proceeds from prosti-
tution. The court held that a health warrant was not a legal basis
for the beginning of such a general search.
A search such as this is contrary to the spirit of service of
process. Even where officers have a valid warrant of arrest, the
law will not allow it to be used as a pretext to search for evidence. 55
Opinion Testimony of an Expert Witness-In State v. Carroll5
the defendant's conviction of arson was largely proven by circum-
stantial evidence and the "opinion testimony" of an expert witness,
who, after he had thoroughly investigated the fire, testified that it
49. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-22-15(2) (1960).
50. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-22-22 (1960).
51. 123 N.W.2d 110 (N.D. 1963).
52. 70 N.D. 722, 297 N.W. 783 (1941).
53. N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-29-10 (1960).
54. Supra note 51.
55. McKnight v. United States 183 F.2d 977 (D.C. Cir. 1950).
56. 128 N.W.2d 659 (N.D. 1961).
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was caused by "human hands." The defendant contended that
permitting the witness to give his opinion was an invasion of the
province of the jury. The Supreme Court, however, held that opinion
testimony is admissible where the witness is qualified as an expert
in the field of investigating fires, and especially in a field such
as this where the ordinary juror would need help.
Recently, the strict rule against the admissibility of opinion
evidence has not been as rigorously applied as it was in earlier
decisions, but this type of testimony still must be used quite sparingly
and only to enable the jury to decide questions of fact. 57
The admission of testimony of an expert witness is allowed only
when it involves explanations and inferences that are not within the
jury's range of ordinary training, knowledge, intelligence, and
experience.58 But where they can properly draw conclusions from
the facts in evidence without the aid of such "opinion testimony"
it will not be allowed. Thus the Court was justified in admitting
the opinion testimony in this case, because the witness was qualified
as an expert in an area where the jury had very little knowledge.
Consequences of a Nonjury Trial-In City of Minot v. Spence59
the defendant was found guilty in police magistrates court of operat-
ing a motor vehicle while intoxicated. The District Court, sitting
without a jury, upheld the conviction. In his appeal the defendant
challenged the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the conviction.
In upholding the decision the Supreme Court declared that in a
criminal case the findings of fact by a nonjury trial court are binding
upon the appellate court, provided there is substantial evidence to
sustain such findings.
Findings of fact made by a court in a nonjury trial are ordinarily
given the same effect as findings of fact tried before a jury, if each
party has agreed to waive a jury trial.60 As a general rule, however,
no new or additional findings of fact may be made by an appellate
court.
Replacement of Indictment and Information with a Complaint-
The Supreme Court was faced with the issue of whether the filing
of a complaint substantially meets the requirement that every
prosecution for a misdemeanor be by indictment or information.
In State v. Buehler a complaint rather than an instrument titled a
criminal information was signed and filed before the county judge.
The defendant contended that the failure to charge him by a criminal
information deprived the court of jurisdiction. But the Supreme
57. State v. Gore, 152 Kan. 551, 106 P.2d 704 (1940).
58. Commonwealth v. Boden, 339 Pa. 298, 159 A.2d 894 (1960).
59. 123 N.W.2d 836 (N.D. 1963).
60. See, e.g., State v. Larson, 61 N.W.2d 274 (N.D. 1953).
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Court declared the complaint to be in essence an information which
fulfilled the requirements of the state constitution, and was the
means by which the County Court of Increased Jurisdiction obtained
its power to act.
In North Dakota, all misdemeanors must be prosecuted by
indictment or information 2 unless trial is held in justice, police,
or county court. From a study of the law of the Dakota Territory,
the Supreme Court found that this criminal complaint would have
constituted an information under the Code of Criminal Procedure
of Dakota Territory for 1877, which required that an information
state that the offense had been committed, and that there was
reasonable ground to believe that the defendant had committed it.
Since this was the law just prior to the adoption of the North Dakota
Constitution, the Supreme Court reasoned that this is what is
presently required of an information so the complaint here was
sufficent.
Willfully Falsifying a Canvass of Votes-In State v. Krueger6 3
the defendant was charged with willfully and unlawfully making a
false canvass of votes cast for the office of States Attorney. On
re-count it was found that one of the candidates had been credited
with thirty-nine more votes than he actually received, while the
other candidate was credited with thirty-eight votes less than
actually had been cast in his favor.
In North Dakota it is a misdemeanor for election officials to
intentionally miscount and incorrectly tabulate votes.6 4 Since the
defendant misstated the number of votes in so many instances, the
Supreme Court sustained the trial court's finding that he knowingly
and intentionally misstated the number of votes received by the
candidates in question.
Invalidity of Arrest as a Bar to Revocation of License under
Implied Consent Statute-The Supreme Court was faced with the
issue of whether the implied consent statute could be invoked to
suspend a driver's license after the motorist had been acquitted.
In Colling v. Hjelle65 the petitioner was arrested for driving while
intoxicated, but was acquitted of the charge. He refused to take
the drunkometer test as provided by the "implied consent" statute6 6
and pursuant to this statute his license was revoked. In affirming
the District Court's action restoring the license, the Supreme Court
reasoned that because the motorist was acquitted, the arrest without
61. 125 N.W.2d 155 (N.D. 1963).
62. N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-01-01 (1960).
63. 124 N.W.2d 468 (N.D. 1963).
64. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-11-31 (1960).
65. 125 N.W.2d 453 (N.D. 1963).
66. N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-20-01 (Supp. 1963).
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a warrant was unlawful. Thus the statute could not be invoked to
suspend the license for refusing the test.
In holding that this arrest was unlawful, the court has rendered
the implied consent statute substantially ineffective. As dissenting
Judge Erickstad pointed out, the majority opinion ignores the
obvious implications of important sections of the implied consent
law which seems to permit an arrest to be made without a warrant
where the law enforcement officer reasonably believes that an
offense has been committed in his presence. And because of this
decision conscientious peace officers can now be held liable for false
arrest when the accused has been acquitted.
6 7
DOMESTIC RELATIONS
Divorce-The question of whether a member of the armed
forces, stationed in North Dakota, may establish his residence here
for the purpose of obtaining a divorce was raised in Slade v. Slade,6e
a case of first impression. The fact of plaintiff's physical presence
for the requisite statutory period of one year was undisputed, but,
relying on section 126 of the constitution," the defendant contended
that the plaintiff could not establish a bona fide intention of
becoming a North Dakota domiciliary. The court, however, in
accordance with the general rule, 70 rejected this argument and
held that this provision created only a rebuttable presumption of
nonresidence; it is construed to mean only that more than mere
physical presence is needed to establish such legal residence.
It was concluded, though, that the requisite intent to become
a resident of North Dakota could not be proven by plaintiff's
testimony alone, uncorroborated by any other testimony or by an
overt act indicating such intention. A stipulation in this case by
defendant's attorney that plaintiff's witness would corroborate
plaintiff's testimony - that he indeed intended to abide in this
state - was sufficient, however, since the stipulation of corroboration
included every material part of the statements of plaintiff.
It would appear from this case that North Dakota requires less
evidence of domiciliary intent in this type of situation than do
many other states; 71 and this is true even though the trend is
toward wider opening of divorce court doors to members of the
armed forces.
7 2
67. For a Law Review Article on this delicate issue, consult 40 N.D.L. Rev. 200 (1964).
68. 122 N.W.2d 160 (N.D. 1963).
69. N.D. CONST. art. V, § 126, states: "No soldier, seaman or marine in the army or
navy of the United States shall be deemed a resident of this state in consequence of his
being stationed therein."
70. E.g., Hammerstein v. Hammerstein, 269 S.W.2d 591, (Tex. Civ. App. 1954); Kan-
kelborg v. Kankelborg, 199 Wash. 259, 90 P.2d 1018 (1939).
71. See, e.g., O'Keefe v. O'Keefe, 209 Ark. 837, 192 S.W.2d 556 (1946); Glassman v.
Glassman, 75 Ohio App. 47, 60 N.E%2d 716 (1944). Both of these cases held that domi-
ciliary intent must be evidenced by overt acts. The Slade case requires this only in the
absence of corroborative testimony.
72. Thames, Domicile of Servicemen, 34 MIss. L.J. 160 (1963).
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In Kucera v. Kucera78 the plaintiff had become pregnant by
a Mr. K-prior to the marriage of the plaintiff and the defendant.
The defendant was aware of all these circumstances at the time
of the ceremony. For six months prior to the bringing of this
action, plaintiff had been visiting this former suitor in her home
once a week without defendant's knowledge, until defendant's
unexpected arrival at the home brought an end to the relationship
and to his ignorance. The court, although finding it difficult to
believe, accepted the trial court's decision that defendant had not
proved adultery, but, contrary to the trial court, it was held that
defendant, on these facts alone, had established plaintiff's extreme
cruelty. It would therfore seem that the ground of adultery is in
reality superfluous; for if the proof of such a charge falls short,
but is sufficient to show reasonable grounds for believing the
other spouse is unfaithful, the plaintiff can win on the ground of
cruelty.
74
Division of Property-In determining a division of the property
of the parties to a divorce, the court is guided by a fairly general
standard: "When a divorce is granted, the court shall make such
equitable distribution of the. . .property. . .as may seem just and
proper. . . having regard to the circumstances of the parties
respectively. ' 75 These "circumstances" have been stated by the
court to include, among other things, the age, ability, and experience
of the parties, the amount of property owned by them, and its
nature.76
In Savelkoul v. Savelkoul7t the wife had obtained a divorce, and
defendant contested the property division on appeal. The decision
was affirmed except for certain oil properties which had been given
to the wife by the lower court. It was held that because this property
was of such a speculative nature as to require skill in managing,
it would be likely to be more productive of income in the hands of
defendant who had had considerable success in the handling of it.
Although as mentioned, the court has referred to the nature of the
property as a circumstance to be considered, there seem to have
been no cases, other than this one, where this criterion has been
even partly determinative of the controversy.
Cosgriff v. Cosgriff7 involved an ambiguous trial court decree
which provided that no final distribution of the property rights was
73. 117 N.W.2d 810 (N.D. 1962).
74. Possibly this result can be prevented by restricting the holding of the court strictly
to Its facts--the case where the plaintiff suspects the defendant of illicit relations with a
suitor with whom defendant had had an affair prior to the marriage. But the drawing
of such a distinction would seem to be superficial at most.
75. N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-05-24 (1960).
76. Agrest v. Agrest, 75 N.D. 318, 27 N.W.2d 697 (1947).
77. 119 N.W.2d 110 (N.D. 1962).
78. 126 N.W.2d 131 (N.D. 1964).
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to be made at that time; another clause stated that the personal
property then in the possession of each of the parties was to remain
their own separate property. Six years later, the trial court ordered
the husband to turn over to the wife one half of seventeen shares
of stock which had been in the husband's possession at the time
of the original decree. Noting that the statute79 requires the court
to divide the property "when the divorce is granted," it would be
assumed that the court had done its duty so far as possible. There-
fore, the stock having been awarded to the husband, the court could
not award one half of it to the wife six years later.80 The provision
relating to the distribution of property was, however, construed to
apply only to the real property in possession of the wife upon which
the husband was making mortgage payments.
Support and Custody of Children-Must a husband support a
child born in wedlock but conceived by a third person prior to the
marriage when the husband knew of his wife's condition at the time
of the marriage? This question was answered in the negative in
Kucera v. Kucera.8 ' The court noted that the presumption that the
husband is the father of a child born during the marriage is rebuttable
and not conclusive, 2 thus rejecting the Iowa rule8 that where the
husband knows of the wife's condition at the time of the ceremony,
the presumption becomes conclusive and he is held to have consented
to stand in loco parentis as to the child. Stating that North Dakota
does not recognize this as a method of adoption, the court embraced
the reasoning of the Oregon court in Burke v. Burke14 that any
theory of adoption should be based on the proposition that the child
is wanted for its own sake, and not on the theory that it is accepted
incidentally as an attachment of the mother.
In another case of first impression, the court accepted what
appears to be the prevailing view. 5 The husband in Cosgriff v.
Cosgriff5 6 was ordered at the time of the divorce to pay a lump
sum of 185 dollars per month for the support of four minor children.
When one of them attained his majority, the husband, without leave
of court, reduced his payments to three fourths of the amount. In
affirming the trial court, it was held that where the amount of
support is a lump sum for all the children instead of a definite
79. N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-05-24 (1960).
80. The court cites no authority for this proposition, but it has been held in North
Dakota that when the decree contains a final distribution of the property, it is to be
treated like any other judgment and cannot be modified later, except for reasons for
which other judgments may be altered. Sinkler v. Sinkler, 49 N.D. 1144, 194 N.W. 817
(1923).
81. 117 N.W.2d 810 (N.D. 1962).
82. State v. Collton, 73 N.D. 582, 17 N.W.2d 546 (1945).
83. State v. Shoemaker, 62 Iowa 343, 17 N.W. 589 (1883) ; accord, Hudson v. Hudson,
151 Neb. 210, 36 N.W.2d 851 (1949). These holdings represent the minority view.
84. 216 Ore. 691, 340 P.2d 948 (1959).
85. Taylor v. Taylor, 147 Colo. 140, 362 P.2d 1027 (1961); Application of Miller, 139
Neb. 242, 297 N.W. 91 (1941).
86. 126 N.W.2d 131 (N.D. 1964).
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sum per child, the sum must be paid until the youngest child
attains majority, except where the husband has applied for and has
been allowed a reduction pursuant to section 14-05-24 of the Century
Code. In support of this holding, the opinion contended that the
expense of supporting three children is not exactly three fourths of
supporting four.
Had the husband's automatic reduction been approved it would
have meant that the court had the power to modify accrued support
payments. This would have been contrary to the majority rule s7
and apparently contradictory to established North Dakota policy 8
A question of custody of a fourteen year old daughter was raised
in a case 9 where the husband, who had obtained a divorce on the
grounds of extreme cruelty, contested the award of custody on the
ground that the mother was unfit. The court in its reasoning
stated the oft-repeated rule that the welfare of the child is of
paramount consideration in the awarding of custody,90 and, even
though the mother's conduct was clearly not exemplary, it was
determined that the lower court had not abused its discretion.
Although not of great significance, this case is interesting in
that it again demonstrates the wide range of discretion afforded
the district courts in determining custody at the time of divorce.
Since no cases have been discovered where the grant of custody in
this situation has been interferred with on appeal, it appears that
where there is any reasonable basis for the decision, it is not likely
to be upset. Reversals have been found only where there has been
a modification of a previous order without a sufficient showing of
changed circumstances. 91
Alimony-Notwithstanding fairly complex attempts to establish
a judgment-proof veil about his property, the husband and his second
wife, whom he married shortly after he was divorced by the plaintiff,
were found in Schriock v. Schriock 92 to have participated in fraud
upon the husband's creditors, including the plaintiff who brought
this action to enforce a judgment for accrued alimony. The defend-
ants organized an incorporated construction company with ninety
per cent of the stock held by the second wife and the rest by two
of her sons. Part of the corporate property was owned by the
husband prior to his second marriage, and it was established that
the husband managed and controlled the corporation in all respects,
87. E.g., Roach v. Oliver, 215 Iowa 800, 244 N.W. 899 (1932); Myers v. Myers, 62
Utah 90, 218 Pac. 123 (1923). Contra, Rudd v. Gerken, 67 S.D. 534, 295 N.W. 491 (1940).
88. Weldy v. Weldy, 74 N.D. 165, 20 N.W.2d 583 (1945) (no power to modify accrued
alimony payments).
89. Nicholson v. Nicholson, 126 N.W.2d 904 (N.D. 1964).
90. Rufer v. Rufer, 67 N.D. 67, 269 N.W. 741 (1931); Schlak v. Schlak, 51 N.D. 897,
201 N.W. 832 (1924).
91. Hedman v. Hedman, 62 N.W.2d 223 (N.D. 1954); Olson v. Olson, 77 N.D. 444, 43
N.W.2d 689 (195a).
92. 128 N.W.2d 852 (N.D. 1964).
BENCH AND BAR 265
including the handling of a substantial part of the ordinary financial
matters. Other circumstances also supported the conclusion that
the arrangement was merely a device to avoid the payment of the
alimony and that the wife held the property for the benefit of the
defendant husband. As a premise to this holding, the court, on the
authority of two similar cases,93 held that fraud in this type of
situation could be proved by indirect evidence.
Another question involved related to the propriety of a court
order directing defendant to procure and produce federal and state
income tax returns. In accordance with the majority view,94 the
court determined that they were not privileged documents and that
the defendant could be directed to produce them. The plaintiff
sought this ruling because the returns contained statements by the
husband inconsistent with his testimony concerning the ownership
of the property.
In Richter v. Richter95 the wife had obtained a divorce and the
custody of three children, subject to the reservation that she could
not remove the children from the county without the consent of the
court. She violated this order, and because of her own contempt,
the trial court in contempt proceedings brought by the wife to enforce
the decree, dismissed the application without prejudice. The plaintiff
then sued for accrued alimony. It was held on appeal that the fact
that the plaintiff was in contempt at the time the alimony accrued
was no bar to recovery in an action at law. In addition, the dismissal
of the prior contempt action was not res judicata because it affected
a matter which was only incidental to the determination of the
main controversy; the dismissal established only that plaintiff had
mistaken her remedy.
9 6
Further indicating that the wife's right to accrued alimony is
not readily divested is Albrecht v. Albrecht,97 where the husband
challenged the propriety of a decree terminating a receivership
over his property, which had been established to enforce an order of
support for the wife pursuant to a judgment of separation, and order-
ing him to pay alimony accrued from the date the parties were
divorced. The divorce had been granted after the order of separation
and prior to the decree challenged on appeal; it granted no alimony
or support and provided that it was a complete and final determi-
nation of all matters at issue between the parties. The husband
contended that this meant the judge had no authority thereafter to
93. Meighen v. Chandler, 20 N.D. 238, 126 N.W. 992 (1910); Shechter v. Shechter,
366 Pa. 30, 76 A.2d 753 (1950).
94. E.g., Bush v. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. 22 F.R.D. 188 (D.C. Neb.
1958); Constantine v. Constantine, 24 Ala. 374, 149 So. 2d 262 (1963). Contra, Peterson
v. Peterson, 70 S.D. 385, 17 N.W.2d 920 (1945).
95. 126 N.W.2d 634 (N.D. 1964).
96. Accord, Spence v. Spence, 290 Mich. 98, 287 N.W. 393 (1939).
97. 120 N.W.2d 165 (N.D. 1963).
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give judgment for accrued alimony, but despite the fact that the
divorce judgment did supersede previous support orders, the court
held that the plaintiff must pay. This appears consistent with the
rule that the court has no power to modify past installments of
alimony.9 8
ESTATES AND TRUSTS
Admissibility of Testimony-Deadman's Statute-The plaintiff
brought an action against the administrator of his father's estate,
alleging that certain real and personal property was included in
the estate which belonged to him.9 9 He testified that an agreement
between him and his father provided that he would be entitled to
certain property if he would remain on the farm and keep certain
equipment in good repair. The defendant failed to object to the
admission of this evidence. Continued testimony concerning this
agreement was objected to and sustained on the basis of section
31-01-03 of the Century Code which provides that a living person
cannot testify as to a transaction with one who is now deceased.
After the sustaining of this objection the plaintiff called the de-
cedent's widow to testify as to the aforementioned transaction.
The trial court held this testimony admissible on the grounds that
the statute only applied to the dealings of a witness with one now
deceased and not to testimony of a third person.
On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed on the same basis.100
The testimony of the widow disclosed that the deceased told his
son that certain machinery would be "yours and mine and to be
left to you." The court found that this statement, plus delivery
of the machinery, constituted a valid gift of one half of the machin-
ery to the plaintiff. The court further found that his statement
meant that the plaintiff would get all of the machinery on the
death of his father. Such a disposition of property was testimen-
tary in character and could only become effective if in compliance
with the Statute of Wills.' 0 ' Not having been willed to the plaintiff,
the court held that one half of the machinery remained in the
father's estate.
Execution of Joint Wills as Part Performance of a Contract
Under the Statute of Frauds-A husband and wife, executed recip-
rocal wills. All of their property was held in joint tenancy. The
wills provided in part that the husband of one of their daughters
had the privilege of purchasing a certain tract of land for a specific
consideration. After the husband died, the wife perfected her title
98. Weldy v. Weldy, supra note 88.
99. Hruby v. Romanick, 128 N.W.2d 106 (N.D. 1964).
100. O'Connor v. Immele, 77 N.D. 346, 43 N.W.2d 649 (1950) ; Perry v. Erdelt, 59 N.D.
741, 231 N.W. 888 (1930).
101. McGillivray v. First Nat'l Bank of Dickinson, 56 N.D. 152, 217 N.W. 150 (1927).
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to the real and personal property as the surviving joint tenant.
Subsequently, she executed an interest free contract with her son-
in-law for the sale of the land. The appellant, another daughter,
alleged that this sale was in derogation of the reciprocally executed
wills in that the wills constituted a contract not to dispose of any
of the property held in joint tenancy. The appellant also alleged
that if the wills did not constitute such a contract, there was an
oral agreement between the husband and wife concerning the land
which was conveyed to the son-in-law. Furthermore, it was con-
tended that the execution of the wills removed this agreement
from coverage by the Statute of Frauds.
The Supreme Court, following the general rule, 10 2 held that the
execution of reciprocal wills, where the wills contained no reference
to a contract, cannot constitute a memorandum of an oral contract
sufficient to satisfy the Statute of Frauds. 10 8
EVIDENCE
Attorney-Client Privilege-Enforceability after the Death of the
Client-The attorney-client privilege is grounded upon the necessity
for providing every client with freedom from any apprehension
about discussing the most personal matters with his attorney. No
retainer need be paid.10 4 No actual employment need result for
the privilege to exist. In the present case,'0 5 the client, after having
discussed the making of a will with an attorney, procured the
services of another to prepare her will. Upon her death, some
of her heirs objected to the probate of this will on the grounds
of undue influence. On appeal to the Supreme Court, the appellants
alleged that the District Court erred in failing to admit the state-
ments of the testatrix because they were not too remote and that
the attorney's testimony should not have been excluded on the
grounds that it was privileged.
The Supreme Court, in reversing the District Court, held that
it is within the discretion of the trial court to admit or exclude
evidence on the grounds of remoteness. The court also stated that
the attorney-client privilege does not survive the client's death
when the matter of his conversations or communications arises
in a will contest or any other type of litigation involving only
heirs at law, next of kin, legatees or devisees of the client. The
court noted that in such cases the proceedings are not adverse to
the estate, and thus the privilege should not apply.
102. Allen v. Bromberg, 164 Ala. 620, 50 So. 884 (1909); Maloney v. Maloney, 258 Ky.
567, 80 S.W.2d 611 (1935) ; Gibson v. Crawford, 247 Ky. 228, 56 S.W.2d 985 (1933).
103. Hagen v. Schluchter, 126 N.W.2d 899 (N.D. 1964).
104. Mack v. Sharp, 138 Mich. 448, 101 N.W. 631 (1904).
105. In re Graf's Estate, 119 N.W.2d 478 (N.D. 1963),
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Wrongful Death Action-Sufficiency of Evidence-The defendant,
who was found liable in a wrongful death action, appealed to the
Supreme Court contending that. the trial court erred in admitting
into evidence certain wearing apparel and personal effects of the
deceased.1 0 6 As to the personal effects, the court held that it would
not review their admissibility because their admission was not prop-
erly objected to in the trial court. The rule that the admissibility
of evidence cannot be challenged for the first time on appeal was
thus once again supported by the Supreme Court. 10 7  The court
held that the jacket was admissible as demonstrative evidence since
it tended to explain or prove an issue in the case. 10 8 The court
also held that the admission or exclusion of demonstrative evidence
is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court.
The defendant further contended that the evidence, as a whole,
was insufficient to prove that he was guilty of gross negligence.
The well established rule is that questions of gross negligence are
for the jury.10 9 When the evidence is such that reasonable minds
can draw but one conclusion therefrom, it becomes a question of
law for the court. 10 The Supreme Court found that the evidence
submitted, which tended to prove that the defendant was driving
at a rate of speed greater than was reasonably safe, and that he
voluntarily directed his attention elsewhere, was sufficient to war-
rant the jury finding the defendant guilty of gross negligence.
The admission of a diagram prepared by the highway patrol-
man was also contended to be prejudicial error. The diagram
showed measurements of the highway, location of the automobiles
after the collision, and the location of the tire or skid marks. The
court held that because the patrolman did not testify that the skid
marks were made by the defendant's car, but only as to what he
observed on the highway, and because evidence of the skid marks
was introduced before the jury in a photograph without objection
by the defendants, the error, if any, was cured by the admission
of the photo and was not prejudicial."'
The exclusion of a doctor's expert opinion was the defendant's
next assignment of error. The doctor's testimony was offered to
prove that the defendant was suffering from amnesia at the time
of the trial and therefore could not remember facts concerning
the accident in question. On cross-examination, the doctor testified
106. Grenz v. Werre, 129 N.W.2d 681 (N.D. 1964).107. For cases expressing this rule see Umphrey v. Deery, 78 N.D. 211, 48 N.W.2d 897(1951); Grant v. Jacobs, 76 N.D. 1, 32 N.W.2d 881 (1948) ; McLain v. Nurnberg, 16 N.D.
144, 112 N.W. 243 (1907).
108. Hampton v. Rautenstrauch, 338 S.W.2d 10'5 (Mo. 1960).
109. Cose v. Towner County, 102 N.W.2d 538 (N.D. 1960); Erdahl v. Hegg, 98 N.W.2d
217 (N.D. 1959).
110. Bauer v. Kruger, 114 N.W.2d 553 (N.D. 1962); King v. Railway Express Agency,
Inc., 107 N.W.2d 509 (N.D. 1961).
111. Hilliboe v. Warner, 17 N.D. 594, 118 N.W. 1047 (1908).
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that he made no tests on which he could base his testimony. The
Supreme Court held that the exclusion of this testimony was proper
because an expert opinion, which is based on a mere medical pos-
sibility, is inadmissible. 112
The defendant's final contention was that the trial court erred
in excluding evidence which was offered to prove that the defendant
had a good reputation in his community for being a careful and
cautious driver. As a general rule, such evidence is not admissible
to prove that a defendant was not guilty of gross negligence at
the time of the accident. 1 3 The application of this general rule led
the Court to hold that the exclusion of such evidence was not error.
INSURANCE
Automatic Insurance Clause-Adhering to a rule of favoring
the insured in deciding ambiguous insurance contracts, the court,
in Adams v. Bartel, 4 held that a provision automatically extending
liability coverage to subsequently-acquired automobiles was not in-
applicable if the policy holder had only one automobile insured
at the time the policy was issued. The defendant owned only one
automobile at the time his policy was issued, but he subsequently
acquired another which was involved in an accident. A clause in
the insurance policy covering the first auto provided that coverage
would be extended to "an automobile ownership of which is acquired
by the named insured or his spouse, if . . . the company insures all
automobiles owned by the named insured and spouse . . - ." The
insurer argued that to say one automobile is the equivalent of all
is to disregard the plain meaning of the language. Section 4293
of Appleman on Insurance supports the insurer's contention that
the provision applies only to fleet coverage, but courts in several
jurisdictions hold contra." 5 In view of the case authority in support,
plus the interest of the public in having automobiles covered by
insurance and the purpose of the clause to broaden coverage, the
court concluded that the automatic insurance clause must be con-
strued to apply in this case.
Mysterious Disappearance Clause-On an issue where there was
little case law to support its holding, the court held in Conlin v.
Dakota Fire Ins. Co.," 6 that the disappearance of property under
unknown, puzzling and baffling circumstances, where there was no
112. Vaux v. Hamilton, 103 N.W.2d 291 (N.D. 1960).
113. Hamilton v. Boyd, 218 Iowa 885, 256 N.W. 290 (1934) Holberg v. McDonald, 137
Neb. 405, 289 N.W. 542 (1940) ; Knoepfle v. Suko, 108 N.W.2d 456 (N.D. 1961); Slack
V. Joyce, 163 Wis. 567, 158 N.W. 310 (1916).
114. 129 N.W.2d 755 (N.D. 1964).
115. Inland Mut. Ins. Co. v. Stallings, 263 F.2d 852 (4th Cir. 1959) ; Horace Mann Mut.
Cas. Co. v. Bell, 134 F. Supp. 307 (W.D. Ark. 1955); Birch v. Harbor Ins. Co., 126 Cal.
App. 2d 714, 272 P.2d 784 (1954); Dunmire Motor Co. v, Oregon Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 166
Ore. 690, 114 P.2d 1005 (1941).
116. 126 N.W.2d 421 (N.D. 1964).
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apparent theft, was sufficient to fit within the meaning of "mysteri-
ous disappearance." Plaintiffs, while on a trip, checked their lug-
gage with an air line company. On arrival at their destination,
they were unable to locate one piece of luggage. An extended
theft coverage clause in their homeowner's fire insurance policy
provided for insurance of personal property lost as a result of
theft or mysterious disappearance. The Louisiana cases," 7 both
following a landmark decision on the subject,"8 were cited as hold-
ing that the facts must show a reasonable possibility that
disappearance was due to theft for the loss to be covered under
the clause. The Louisiana court, however, has since reversed its
position"1 9 and now requires only that the disappearance be under
unknown, puzzling and baffling circumstances which arouse wonder,
curiosity or speculation, or under circumstances which are difficult
to understand or explain. The North Dakota court prefers the latter
position, particularly in light of a statutory rule of construction
that an ambiguity must be construed against the party who caused
the uncertainty to exist. 2 0
Insurable Interest of One Who Has Vendor's Lien-In Koppinger
v. Implement Dealers Mut. Ins. Co., 1 21 the defendant issued a policy
insuring a dwelling house owned by the plaintiff against loss by
fire. The plaintiff sold the house, accepting partial cash payment
and a note for the balance from the purchaser. The house burned
before the policy expired, but the defendant contended the plaintiff
no longer had an insurable interest. A North Dakota statute
22
provides that one who sells real property has a vendor's lien thereon
for the amount of the unpaid and unsecured balance. The de-
fendant argued that when the plaintiff consented to the execution
of a mortgage by which the purchaser obtained a loan on the
premises, any right he had to a vendor's lien was extinguished.
The court held that the effect of consent was to give the mortgage
priority, not to destroy the lien. Thus, the vendor retained an
insurable interest in the property to the extent of the purchase
price unpaid at the time of the loss.
Agent-Principal Relationship-Insurable Interest-The plaintiff,
a contractor, applied to the agent of the defendant for builder's
risk insurance. The agent transmitted the application, but before
the policy was issued and after a sixty-day statutory period in
which the policy was to become void for nonpayment of the
premium, the building under construction by the contractor
117. Deckler v. Travelers Inderr. Co., 94 So. 2d 55 (La. 1957); Loop v. United States
Fid. & Guar. Ins. Co., 63 So. 2d 247 (La. 1953).
118. Davis v. St. Paul Mercury & Indem. Co., 227 N.C. 80, 40 S.E.2d 609 (1946).
119. Englehart v. Assurance Co. of America, 139 So. 2d 108 (La. 1961).
120. N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-07-19 (1960).
121. 122 N.W.2d 134 (N.D. 1963).
122. N.D. CENT. CODE § 35-20-01 (1960).
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burned. During the sixty-day period, the plaintiff had approached
the agent to inquire about the premium payment and was advised
to wait, as he would be billed later. Insurer denied liability. A
parol agreement to insure, entered into by an agent having authority
to bind the insurance company, is the agreement of the principal
and not the agent. 2 3 The court in the instant case1 2 4 held in favor
of the plaintiff, as it was undisputed that he would have paid the
premium had he been permitted to do so, that he had relied on
statements of the agent, and that there was nothing to show that
the policy would not have been issued had it not been for negligence
on the part of the defendant insurance company or its agent. The
defendant also argued that the plaintiff had no insurable interest.
Although early insurance law required title and ownership as a
basis of an insurable interest, the court finds ample case law to
support its decision that under section 26-02-06 of the Century Code,
contractors and builders have insurable interests in buildings for
which they furnish labor, skill or materials, at least where they
are to receive payment in installments or upon completion of the
work. Also, the defendant argued that because the building in
question was owned by a city, it was insurable only in the State
Fire and Tornado Fund,125 but the court held that another statute
126
is specifically tailored for builder's risk insurance not found in the
Fire and Tornado Fund statute. Fire insurance on a city-owned
building in the process of being altered under private contract
may be insured in a private, solvent company in an amount suf-
ficient to protect the contractor.
Agent-Principal Notice Can be Question of Fact-While notice
to an agent generally is notice to his principal, there are circum-
stances when determination of such notice is a question of fact,
and the court so held in Lindlauf v. Northern Founders Ins. Co.
1 27
Deceased insured had falsely answered questions asked by a medi-
cal examiner relative to insured's medical history as to heart
disease. The plaintiff, deceased insured's wife, sought to avoid the
effect of the false answers by a claim that the insured had dis-
closed to insurer's agents that he was a doubtful risk because he
had high blood pressure. The trial court instructed the jury, without
reservation, that notice to an agent was imputed to the principal.
In overruling the trial court, the Supreme Court held that from the
notice the insurer derived from its agent and from information
derived from insured's answers to the medical examiner, the insurer
could have assumed that the high blood pressure was a temporary
condition that had disappeared without treatment; the question was
123. Ulledalen v. United States Fire Ins. Co., 74 N.D. 589, 23 N.W.2d 856 (1946).
124. Reishus v. Implement Dealers Mut. Ins. Co., 118 N.W.2d 673 (N.D. 1962).
125. N.D. CENT. CODE § 26-24-04 (1960).
126. N.D. CENT. CODE § 48-01-03 (1960).
127. 130 N.W.2d 86 (N.D. 1964).
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not one that should have been ruled upon as a matter of law. The
court also held that the question of materiality of insured's mis-
representations should not have been submitted to a jury, as was
permitted by the trial court, because it was an issue upon which
reasonable minds could not differ and was a question of law for the
court.
Real Party in Interest-In two related cases, the court restated
its position that the real party in interest must bring suit. In Regent
Co-op Equity Exch. v. Johnston's Fuel Liners,1 2s judgment was
given in favor of the plaintiff for the use and benefit of certain
insurance companies. The defendant contended the trial court had
erred in denying a motion for dismissal on the ground that the
action was not brought in the name of the real party in interest.
The insured had received payment from insurance companies but
had suffered damage for which it had not been compensated by
insurance, and thus was held to have a real interest in the action.
At common law, the rule was that a suit to enforce an insurer's
rights must be brought in the name of the insured. 129 Under statutes
such as N.D.R. Civ. P. 17(a), the real party in interest is required
to bring the action. Where the insurer has paid the loss in full
and has received assignment of the full claim of the insured
for damages, the insurer is the real party in interest and must
bring the action. 130 However, if the insurance covers only a portion
of the loss, the right of action remains in the insured for the entire
loss and the action should be brought in the name of the insured.' 81
The court here declares that, in effect, the insured is made a trustee
for the insurer to the extent of the insurer's interest, and the
defendant-appellant's motion that subrogated fire insurance carriers
be substituted as parties plaintiff was properly denied. In the com-
panion case,'3 2 the court held that the trial court was in error in
denying the defendant's motion for dismissal where the plaintiff's
loss had been paid in full by the insurer. The contention by the
plaintiff that it had an interest in the outcome of the action be-
cause the insured was a member of a reciprocal insurance company
and its premiums were related to its losses was held not to fall
within the type of interest contemplated by rule 17(a).
LICENSURE
Revocation of a Driver's License-The Supreme Court has re-
cently decided two cases which involved the revocation of drivers'
licenses. One involved the "Implied Consent" act and the other
128. 122 N.W.2d 151 (N.D. 1963).
129. Verdier v. Marshallville Equity Co., 70 Ohio App. 434, 46 N.E.2d 636 (1940).
130. Hermes v. Markham, 78 N.D. 268, 49 N.W.2d 238 (1951).
131. Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Arlt, 61 N.W.2d 429 (N.D. 1953).
132. Newby v. Johnston's Fuel Liners, Inc., 122 N.W.2d 156 (N.D. 1963).
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involved a "serious offense." Although they are different in nature,
they are analogous in that both emphasize the right to retain a drivers
license rather than safety on the highways.
In McDonald v. Ferguson,133 the court once again followed its
controversial precedent setting decision of Colling v. Hjelle'3 ' inter-
preting the "Implied Consent" act'3 5 to mean that where the de-
fendant is acquitted on the charge of operating a vehicle on the
public highways under the influence of intoxicating liquor, the arrest
is illegal. Therefore, the Highway Commissioner is without authority
to revoke the operator's license for refusal to take the drunkometer
test. The modern trend, and the view that Justice Erickstad took
in his dissent in Colling, is that a police officer is entitled to make
an arrest without a warrant if at the time of the arrest the person's
conduct is such that a reasonably prudent officer believed in good
faith that the person was violating the law. 3 6 Justice Erickstad
concurred in the instant case on the grounds that the affidavit
submitted did not disclose that the arresting officer had reasonable
grounds to believe that the offense of drunken driving had been
committed.
The Supreme Court refused to uphold the Highway Commis-
sioner's ruling in Morrell v. Hjelle,"17 revoking the driver's license
of the appellant, for having been convicted of reckless driving,
failure to have his car under control, and five speeding violations.
The Commission felt that this conduct indicated a disrespect for
traffic law and a disregard for the safety of others. 3 8 Furthermore,
they felt that the behavior of the appellant was a "serious offense"
for which his license could be revoked. The court held that
"serious offense" must be given its usual meaning, which is some-
thing special. The justices reasoned that the nature of the particular
offense rather than the frequency of offenses was the determining
factor and that since the Commissioner relied solely on the series
of offenses for his ruling and had failed to establish that a serious
offense had been committed, the action must be set aside.
In interpretating a statute which is very similar in language
to one contained in the Century Code,'3 9 it has been held that before
the court can review the action of the Commissioner, the nature of
the offenses, the relationship of such offenses to over-all traffic
safety, the past driving record of the offender, and any other facts
and circumstances properly bearing upon the wisdom of the sus-
133. 129 N.W.2d 348 (N.D. 1964).
134. 125 N.W.2d 453 (N.D. 1963).
135. N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-20-01 (1960).
136. See, e.g., Smith v. Hubbard, 253 Minn. 215, 91 N.W.2d 756 (1958).
137. 128 N.W.2d 728 (N.D. 1964).
138. N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-06-32 (1960).
139. Compare WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 46-20-290 (4) (1962) with N.D. CENT. CODE §
39-06-32 (1960).
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pension must be considered.140 The court, taking the opposite view,
has determined that a "serious offense" must be established entirely
on the circumstances of each case. One factor present in the in-
stant case which lends support to the more liberal interpretation
is that one offense, of which the plaintiff was convicted-reckless
driving-requires mandatory revocation of one's license on a sub-
sequent conviction of the same offense.
1 41
Licensing of Medical Facilities-The determination of what con-
stitutes an existing facility for a nursing home was involved in
Bush v. North Dakota Health Council, Dep't of Health4 2 where the
petitioners, who had operated a licensed general hospital from 1941
to 1962, immediately upon ceasing to function as a hospital, made
an application for a license to operate a nursing home. The court
held that there was no distinction between a medical hospital and
nursing home, and the contention that this is a new operation, since
the use of the facilities is more limited, could not be sustained.
The decision is based upon an interpretation of section 23-01-03 (4)
of the Century Code. This provision gives the Health Council au-
thority and power in the development, establishment, and enforce-
ment of basic standards for hospitals and related medical institutions
"with the exception that no regulations shall be enforced upon
existing facilities unless they are for the purpose of safety." The
court, by taking this licensing decision out of the hands of the
Council, was adhering to the rule that a statute of this kind must
be reasonably interpreted for the benefit of the people and that
it is for the court to determine what is reasonable.14 3 Justice Teigen
concurred, taking issue with whether an existing medical institution
necessarily is eligible to be licensed as an institution for nursing
care, but concluded that the decision was ultra vires with respect
to the council.
A significant factor in this case is that the court has spelled
out what it considers to be matters relating to safety factors and
therefore within the council's authority.
4 4
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS
Engineer's Decision Binding on City-In City of Granville v.
Kovash, Inc.,' 45 the city sued for damages claimed to have been
suffered due to the failure of the defendant to properly construct a
water distribution system. The system was found to have been in-
stalled too close to the surface of the ground in violation of the
140. Ledgering v. State, 63 Wash. 2d 94, 385 P.2d 522, 527 (1963).
141. N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-06-31 (1960).
142. 128 N.W.2d 866 (N.D. 1964).
143. Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. Warner, 77 N.D. 721, 45 N.W.2d 196 (1950).
144. Supra note 142, at 871.
145. 118 N.W.2d 354 (N.D. 1962).
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specifications which caused the lines to freeze. A representative of
the engineer had inspected all the work as it progressed and the
engineer had given the project his final approval.
The defendant claimed that since the specifications called for
a cover of seven and one-half feet on all lines, and the average
cover on the lines as installed was almost seven and one-half feet,
he had substantially performed the contract. The court held that
substantial performance contemplates the completion, except for
unimportant details,146 and that the placing of any part of a water
line at such shallow depths that it will freeze is not an unimportant
detail.
The court further held that the clause in the contract which
made the decision of the engineer final precludes the city from
recovering. The contractor was held liable for the repairs to the
system under a clause in the contract that required the contractor
to keep the system in repair for one year.
Engineer's Interpretation of a Contract is Limited to Specifi-
cations-In Eickhof Constr. Co. v. City of Grafton147 the contractor
had entered into a contract wherein he was to do certain construction
work which included the laying of water lines and imbedding them
in pit-run gravel which he was to supply. The contractor did the
work, including the gravel hauling, but the engineer refused to
approve payments to him for the gravel. The contract stated that
the engineer was to define the specifications, resolve all disputes
between the owner and the contractor, and that these decisions were
to be final. The court held that the contract was ambiguous as
to the method of payment for the gravel and that the attempt of
the engineer 'to determine the method of payment involved an
interpretation of the contract, a matter that is reserved for the
courts.148 The contractor was allowed to collect payment for that
gravel that he could prove was used properly.
Right of Engineer to Collect Fee for Project that Voters Reject-
Kirkham, Michael and Associates v. City of Minot149 dealt exclusively
with statutory interpretation. The city had planned a storm sewer
improvement and had entered into a contract with the plaintiff to
prepare the plans and specifications. After the plans had been
prepared, voters in the affected area protested in sufficient numbers
to cause the city to cancel the project. The city proceeded on the
assumption that the protest was binding upon it and that it had no
right to proceed with the project. The plaintiff sued to collect the
146. See Anderson v. Todd, 8 ND. 158, 77 N.W. 599 (1898); Braseth v. State Bank
of Edinburgh, 12 N.D. 486, 98 N.W. 79 (1904).
147. 123 N.W.2d 580 (N.D. 1963).
148. See Kyburz v. State, 108 N.W.2d 645, (S.D. 1961).
149. 122 N.W.2d 862 (N.D. 1963).
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fee that it claimed was due under the contract provision calling for
payment of seventy per cent of the fee when the plans were presented
and the remainder upon completion of the project. The court held
that the statute, exempting sewers from improvements for which
a resolution of necessity must be adopted,'150 embraced storm sewers.
This meant that the voters' resolution did not bind the city officials
and that the city had the right to go ahead with the planned improve-
ment. Furthermore, the engineering firm could recover the fee.
City Must Pay for Care of its Prisoners Housed in County Jail-
The city of Grand Forks had housed its prisoners in the county jail
for some time without paying for their care and maintenance and
without any agreement to make any such payments. The county
sued the city to collect for its expenditures in caring for these
prisoners for the preceding six years. 151 The court held the city liable
to the county on an implied contract on the basis that the statute
requiring counties to "establish" a jail 52 refers only to the con-
struction of a jail and not to the care of the prisoners contained
therein. This, the court said, is consistent with other statutes which
give the city the benefit of the labor of the prisoners and their
fines,' 53 reflecting a legislative intent that the city should also be
responsible for the cost of their care.
Agricultural Teaching Lands not Annexable-When the city of
Fargo attempted to annex certain land, some of the landowners
protested and a hearing was had before the Cass County Annexation
Review Commission. That hearing resulted in a finding by the
Commission that some of this land, which was used by the North
Dakota State University of Agriculture and Applied Sciences for
crops, hay, pasture and granaries, could not be annexed since it
was used exclusively for agricultural purposes and is therefore
exempt from annexation under North Dakota law." 4 The city then
applied to the District Court for a writ of certiorari, which was
refused. The Supreme Court upheld the District Court and the
Annexation Commission' 55 finding that the land is used exclusively
for agricultural purposes within the meaning of the statute.
Non-Use of Water Conservation District Does Not Cause Forfeit-
ure of Rights and Powers-On July 30, 1946, the Nelson County
Conservation District was established by an order of the State Water
Commission. No directors were appointed until March 7, 1961, when
the County Commissioners appointed a board which promptly pro-
vided for the levy of taxes. The plaintiff sued for an injunction
150. N D. CENT. CODE § 40-22-15 (1960).
151. Grand Forks County v. City of Grand Forks, 123 N.W.2d 42 (N.D. 1963).
152. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-44-01 (1960).
153. N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 40-11-12; 40-11-13; 40-18-12 (1960).
154. N.D. CENT. CODE § 40-51-10 (1960).
155. City of Fargo v. Annexation Review Comm'n, 123 N.W.2d 281 (N.D. 1963).
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to prevent the spreading of the levy, 156 contending that the district
was never legally created under the then existing law, 157 or under
the present law, 158 and that the law under which the district was
sought to be formed was repealed before the organization was
perfected. 5 9 This, he alleged, nullified the attempted establishment
of the district. The plaintiff also argued that if the district was
legally created, its rights and powers had been forfeited by non-use.
The court held that the district had the power to levy the tax, since
it was legally formed. It also said that non-use does not revoke
the rights and powers of a municipal corporation in this state, as it
does in some jurisdictions. 160 The district was legally organized,
and the new statute contained a validation clause which prevented
the revocation by repeal of the prior act.
Municipal Industrial Development Act Constitutional-The city
of Wahpeton proposed to issue revenue bonds to finance construction
of a sugar beet plant. Upon completion, the plant would be leased
to a corporation formed for the purpose of operating it. In a suit
to determine the validity of this action,161 the court held that the
Municipal Industrial Act of 1955162 is constitutional as its aims fall
within the public purpose as this court has defined it.163 It also
stated that the bonds may be used to finance the purchase of real
estate or anything permanently attached thereto, but not to purchase
vehicles or laboratory equipment not attached to buildings. The
plaintiff also claimed that the lease was invalid due to the fact
that the corporation with which the city proposed to enter into the
lease was without funds or experience in operating a plant of this
type. The court said that the city officials must be given credit
for having some common sense and that a lease with a lessee who
is without resources is legal under the act, however foolish it may be.
REAL PROPERTY
Party Walls-It frequently happens that a claim may be good
at law but stale in equity. So it was, in Brandhagen v. Burt,'" that
the plaintiffs found themselves unable to make out a convincing
case after keeping silent for eleven years. In 1949 Kenneth Brand-
hagen agreed with defendant Burt to build a party wall, eighteen
inches inside the Brandhagen's lot line, and to share the cost of
the wall, water and sewer lines, and agreed to give Burt an easement.
Mrs. Brandhagen knew of the negotiations but did not take part in
156. Snortland v. Nelson County, 123 N.W.2d 288 (N.D. 1963).
157. N.D. REV. CODE § 61-1602 (1943).
158. N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-16-45 (1960).
159. N.D. Sess. Laws 1949, ch. 348, § 32, at 486.
160. See Cincinnati, N.O. & T.P. Ry. Co. v. Baughman, 116 Ky. 479, 76 S.W. 351 (1903).
161. Gripentrog v. City of Wahpeton, 126 N.W.2d 230 (N.D. 1964).
162. N.D. CENT. CODE § 40-57 (1960).
163. See Green v. Frazier, 44 N.D. 395, 176 N.W. 11 (1920); aff'd, 253 U.S. 233.
164. 117 N.W.2d 296 (N.D. 1962).
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the oral agreement, which was reduced to writing but never executed.
The plaintiff never cashed the defendant's postdated check, nor did
he or his wife ever execute the easement. After eleven years,
plaintiffs sued to quiet title and recover damages for use and
occupation; defendant counterclaimed for specific performance of
the agreement. The District Court decided, 16 5 inter alia, that defend-
ant was not at fault, ordered specific performance against Kenneth
Brandhagen in return for defendant's payment to him of his half of
the agreed price, and granted damages to Mrs. Brandhagen for her
half of the agreed price in return for an easement to the defendant.
On trial de novo, the Supreme Court affirmed. The defendant's
payment for repairs, his agreement to restrict the nature of his
business, and his payment of one half the cost of installing the
common sewer and water lines was sufficient partial performance
to take this agreement out of the Statute of Frauds.1 6  Mr. Brand-
hagen could contract only with respect to his own interest, but his
wife was fully aware of the negotiations leading up to the agreement,
and had acquiesced in the defendant's expenditure of large amounts
in good faith. The court applied the familiar doctrine of equitable
estoppel to restrict her damages to the amount to which she was
entitled under the original agreement. In so doing, the court nicely
balanced the equities of the conflicting claims and gave effect to
an agreement which had governed the litigants' relations for more
than a decade.
Reservations to One Not a Party to the Deed-What is the effect
of a reservation to a third party, a stranger to the deed? This was
the question put to the Supreme Court for the first time upon the
following facts: A and his wife deeded their land to C, reserving
four-fifths of the mineral interests to B, who thereupon quit-claimed
to A, this time reserving a one-fifth mineral interest to himself.
After C conveyed to D, with an identical reservation of four-fifths
of the mineral rights to B, A's administrator sued D 61 to quiet title
in the reserved interest. The District Court held that the reservation,
void as to B, operated to keep the interest with the grantor, and the
Supreme Court affirmed, in Stetson v. Nelson.16 8 Dispensing with
an elaborate analysis, the court held, on general principles, that the
reservation was void, and since no party to any of the deeds intended
that the reserved interest pass to the grantees, it must have been
intended that the interest remain with the grantor, A. In so holding,
the court followed the path of history and the decided weight of
authority. 69 The failure of the original reservation to have the
165. Citing Owenson v. Bradley, 50 N.D. 741, 197 N.W. 885 (1924), the only available
precedent in' point, but the Supreme Court omitted the case from its opinion.
166. N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-10-01 (1960).
167. B was not only a stranger to the deed, but was not a party to this action.
168. 118 N.W.2d 685 (N.D. 1962).
169. See Harris, Reservationa in Favor of Strangers to the Title, 6 OKLA. L. PtEv. 127
(1953).
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declared effect can be explained by the common law rule, which
probably influenced the court, that "words of grant or conveyance
are essential to pass title by deed,' 170 and that words of reservation
fail to qualify. But the better rule, looking to the intention of the
parties, construes words of exception and reservation to a stranger
to the deed to pass title by grant. And the Minnesota Supreme
Court has so held.
171
Unitization of Oil Fields-In Arnstad v. North Dakota State
Industrial Comm'n'72 a landowner's rights were determined by his
failure to appeal from an order of the commission of which he had
no actual or official notice. In 1958 the commission approved a
unit agreement for the Tioga-Madison oil field, an area surrounding
appellant's land. As he had no oil wells, he was not an "operator"
within rule 701 of the commission, and was not entitled to notice of
the hearing. The unit operator then signed up ninety-eight per cent
of the landowners, but not appellant, and sought to obtain the com-
mission's approval for the pumping of water into the reservoir. The
appellant appeared by counsel at the second hearing, and objected.
From the order granting the unit operator's request, the appellant
appealed to the District Court and the Supreme Court, both of which
affirmed. The court held that the first order, from which no appeal
was taken, precluded the raising once again of the issues of whether
"the agreement was in the public interest, protective of correlative
rights, and reasonably necessary . . . ,,117 The court grounded its
decision upon Syverson v. North Dakota State Industrial Comm'n,174
a related case with materially different facts .15 The holding in the
instant case was inequitable, if not a naked denial of due process.
Since appellant was not an "operator," he was not notified of the
hearing upon which the commission granted its approval of the
agreement. Appellant approved of the order, so the provisions for
rehearing1 76 and appeal 7 7 were of little use to him. The main thrust
of appellant's complaint is that the unit operator has denied him
an opportunity to participate in an operation which drains oil from
his land. Rather than deciding that appellant should have appealed
from an order of which he had no notice, thus cutting off his only
hope of a hearing on the issue of his participation, it would have
been far better for the court to have remanded to the commission
for a determination of appellant's rights in light of the unit operator's
170. Id. at 132.
171. Aldrich v. Soucheray, 133 Minn. 382, 158 N.W. 637 (1916).
172. 122 N.W.2d 857 (N.D. 1963).
173. Id. at 860.
174. 111 N.W.2d 128 (N.D. 1961).
175. The Syversons did not want to participate in the unit agreement, although partici-
pation was offered to them. The court rightly held that the Syversons could not block
the operation of the unit agreement simply by refusing to join it.
176. N.D. CENT. CODE § 38-08-13 (Supp. 1964).
177. N.D. CENT. CODE § 38-08-14 (Supp. 1964).
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action subsequent to the commission's original approval of the
agreement.
Joinder of Parties in Condemnation Proceedings-Failure to join
a necessary party has been the cause of many difficulties, and in
Borchelt v. Wentz, 17 8 the Supreme Court would not even consider a
vital piece of plaintiffs' evidence for this reason. During the eminent
domain proceeding condemning their land, plaintiffs tried to counter
the defendant Highway Commissioner's evidence that they were
joint tenants to an undivided one-half of the land, and tenants in
common with their son to the other undivided half, by offering proof
that they had paid the entire purchase price, and were entitled to
the entire damages. The District Court rejected this offer of proof,
and the Supreme Court affirmed on the basis that since plaintiffs'
son, the record owner of an undivided one-half interest in common,
was not a party to the action or the appeal, the court could make
no determination as to his interest. It is perhaps unfortunate that
the plaintiffs should have lost on such a simple error, but it is
difficult to see how the court could have decided otherwise. Rule
19 (a) is very clear on this point that "persons having a joint interest
shall be made parties ... ,"17 and failure to join the son rightly
prevented adjudication of his interest;1 80 but the judgment is not
res judicata as to such a determination, 181 and presumably plaintiffs
could commence another action to gain legal title to the property.
18 2
Eminent Domain-Much of the entire country has recently been
confronted with the problems arising from the construction of limited
access highways. North Dakota was faced with and answered some
of these questions in Chandler v. Hjelle.83 This case arose as the
result of the conversion of a land service road into a limited access
highway. The plaintiff, property owner, contended that it was error
to instruct the jury that the rights of an abutting property owner,
to reasonable ingress and egress, were subject to the state's
paramount right to improve and control highways in the public
interest.
Two distinct powers have been used to control the rights of
access; the police power and the power of eminent domain. Police
power is the right of reasonable regulation by the government clearly
necessary to preserve the health, safety, or morals of the people.
184
Eminent domain is the power to take property for public use. 185
Property taken, injured, or destroyed under the doctrine of eminent
178. 123 N.W.2d 831 (N.D. 1963).
179. N.D.R. Crv. P. 19(a).
180. N.D.R. Civ. P. 19(b).
181. Morrissey v. Bologna, 240 Miss. 284, 123 So. 2d 537 (1960).
182. N.D. CENT. CODE § 59-01-06 (1960).
183. 126 N.W.2d 141 (N.D. 1964).
184. Appeal of White, 287 Pa. 259, 134 A. 409 (1926).
185. Ibd.
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domain is compensable, while that taken under the police power
is non-compensable even though it amounts to an actual taking
or destruction of property. 186 The paramount right theory that is
mentioned in the contested instruction is applicable to an exercise
of the police power, but is not applicable to a taking of property
under the eminent domain concept. 187 It appears that the court was
quite justified in remanding this case for a new trial on the ground
that the contested instruction was prejudicial error.
Perhaps an even more significant aspect of this case is that the
court, not content with the remand for a new trial, went on to
establish that the future adaptability of property is a factor to be
taken into consideration when determining its market value. This
however, was qualified by the phrase "as will in reasonable
probability affect its present value.'
' 188
It would appear that the court has opened the door to much
litigation in that the speculative nature of the future adaptibility of
property is bound to produce much controversy. Furthermore, what
would be too remote, speculative or uncertain could very well
produce a gross disparity among judicial determinations.
REMEDIES
Injunctive Relief-It is generally held that injunctive relief will
not be granted to an abutting or adjacent landowner when drainage
facilities provided by highway authorities divert the natural flow
of surface water onto his property. 8 9 But an exception is realized
when the landowner has been sufficiently damaged to warrant the
issuing of an injunction against the highway officials. This was
the attitude taken by the court in the first Viestenz v. Arthur
Twp. 9 0 case tried in 1950. The court held that an injunction should
issue against township supervisors restraining them from obstructing
the drainage of waters that accumulate in the highway ditches and
repeatedly overflow and flood adjoining land to the irreparable
damage of the owners when the owners did not have an adequate
remedy at law.
In 1950, the petitioners brought an action against the township
alleging that in the process of reconstructing certain highways the
natural flow of surface water had been obstructed, causing flooding
of the petitioners' land. The District Court refused to grant a
permanent injunction and dismissed the petitioners' complaint. The
Supreme Court determined that a permanent injunction should issue
and that the best method of finding an outlet for these waters must
186. Ibid.
187. Chandler v. HIjelle, 126 N.W.2d 141 (N.D. 1964).
188. Id. at 148.
189. E.g., Maynard v. Hawley, 331 Mich. 123, 49 N.W.2d 92 (1951).
190. 54 N.W.2d 572 (N.D. 1952).
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be determined by the township board in accordance with good
engineering practices. Following this decree, the township in Sep-
tember of 1952, employed an engineer who recommended that the
ditch paralleling the petitioners' property be cleared and deepened
to a point where it ran into a coulee, and that the coulee bed should
be deepened and cleaned.
The solution proved adequate until 1962 when heavy rains again
caused flooding. Upon refusal of the District Court to enforce the
1952 injunction, the petitioners appealed to the Supreme Court'9 '
contending that the action taken by the township in 1952 was in-
effective, and that the only way to properly control the water was
to restore the natural flow. It was requested that such action be
taken. The court held that it was proper to exercise continued
jurisdiction for the purpose of enforcing and making the permanent
injunction effective, that the petitioners were entitled to an enforce-
ment of the mandatory injunction requiring a restoration of the
natural flow of surface water, and that such action should be taken
by the District Court.
Rescission-In Volk v. Volk 9 2 the Supreme Court determined
that the District Court had jurisdiction to hear an action for
rescission of an agreement formulated in probate court, concerning
the family settlement of an estate. In his action for rescission,
plaintiff, an heir, contended that he did not know what he was doing
as he was mentally unsound at the time of the proceeding in County
Court. The District Court dismissed plaintiff's action on the plead-
ings, but the Supreme Court reversed. Though the County Court
could not equitably or constitutionally hear an action for rescission,
the District Court could take jurisdiction in the exercise of its
equitable power.1 93 And since the complaint presented the issue of
fact of plaintiff's state of mind at the time of the agreement, judgment
on the pleadings was improper.
SCHOOLS AND SCHOOL DISTRICTS
Detachment and Annexation of Territory-The Century Code
provides that the Board of County Commissioners can, upon appli-
cation of two-thirds of the residents of a particular territory, detach
that land from one school district and annex it to another. 9 4 The
Supreme Court recently held in Cathay Special School Dist. No. 9
v. Wells County' 5 that the district from which the territory was
detached had such a special interest in that property as to permit
it to appeal the board's decision to the District Court in order to
191. Viestenz v. Arthur Twp., 129 N.W.2d 33 (N.D. 1964).
192. 121 N.W.2d 701 (N.D. 1963).
193. Muhlhauser v. Becker, 76 N.D. 402, 37 N.W.2d 352 (1949).
194. N.D. CENT. CODE § 15-27-14 (1961).
195. 118 N.W.2d 720 (N.D. 1962).
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test the legality of the administrative proceeding. Such a school
district is an "aggrieved party" under section 11-11-39 of the Century
Code. This decision was reached despite the fact that the "aggrieved"
district was given property in exchange and therefore did not suffer
a decrease in its total tax valuation.
The Cathay decision further indicates that uninhabited territory
cannot be annexed to another school district, since the exclusive
statutory procedure 9 can be invoked only by residents of the
territory proposed to be annexed. This inference is drawn from
the court's refusal to allow the application of a non-resident owner
of uninhabited territory to satisfy the requirements of the applicable
statute.
Dissolution of School District-In Public School Dist. No. 35 v.
Cass County Bd. of Comm'rs197 the Supreme Court refused to in-
validate a statute'98 providing for the dissolution of a school district
and attachment of its territory to an adjacent district by the action
of the board of county commissioners. The court held that the
application of this statute does not impair contractual obligations,
nor does it take away vested rights in violation of any constitutional
provision since the "aggrieved party" can appeal the commissioners'
decision to the District Court. 199
Non-resident Pupils-Myhre v. School Bd. of No. Cent. Pub.
School Dist.2 0 0 held that a pupil from outside the school district, who
resides in another organized school district, can be admitted only
when the attendance of such non-resident pupil is consented to by
the school district of the pupil's residence, or where such attendance
is based on reasons of convenience. 20 1 This, however, is subject to
approval by a three member committee consisting of the county
judge, the state's attorney, and the county superintendent of schools.
Only in such cases must the resident district pay tuition as provided
by law.
Duty of School Board to Inform a Prospective Teacher of
District Policies-The Supreme Court has held that a wrongfully
discharged school teacher could collect his salary, less earnings he
had actually made elsewhere.2 0 2 This case does not squarely hold
that the teacher has a duty to take any other employment available
in order to mitigate damages. It does, however, indicate that he
would have to accept an offer to teach in his field. The court also
196. Supra note 194.
197. 123 N.W.2d 37 (N.D. 1963).
198. N.D. CENT. CODE § 15-22-21 (1960).
199. See Cathay Special School Dist. No. 9 v. Wells County, 118 N.W.2d 720 (N.D. 1962).
200. 122 N.W.2d 816 (N.D. 1963).
201. Myhre v. School Bd. of No. Cent. Pub. School Dist., 122 N.W.2d 816 (N.D. 1963).
See 40 N.D.L. REv. 302 for an extensive discussion of this case.
202. Miller v. South Bend Special School Dist. No. 1, 124 N.W.2d 475 (N.D. 1963).
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holds that a school board can require a teacher to live in a certain
locale, but such requirement must be made known to the teacher
prior to the signing of the contract or be included in the employment
contract itself.
Discontinuance of School-Effect on Contract Rights-Sections
15-25-08 and 15-25-09 of the Century Code allow school boards to
discontinue the operation of a school if the enrollment falls below
a certain minimum for a ten-day period and if facilities are elsewhere
provided for the students. Linden School Dist. No. 24 v. Porter20 3
held that the Code provisions in the aforementioned sections for
discontinuing payment of teacher's salary is valid and that the
district board had no duty to inform the teacher of an intention to
discontinue the school. This case further held that the board must
continue the salary of other school employees for the life of their
contracts as the statute only applies to those specifically included
therein.
SECURED TRANSACTIONS
Merger of Estates or Interests-Does a merger of interests occur
when a mortgagee acquires title to the property by warranty deed
from the mortgagor? Such was the question before the Supreme
Court in Small v. Cunningham.24 After issuance of the mortgage,
but prior to the giving of the warranty deed, a third party had
obtained a judgment against the mortgagor. If a merger had
occurred, the judgment creditor would have a valid claim against
the property, but if no merger had occurred, the judgment creditor's
claim remained inferior to the mortgagee's interest. The court held
that "in order to effect a merger, the estates or interests must meet
in the same person at the same time and in the same right. It
will be presumed that there was no merger where there is an
intervening title or lien or, where to decree a merger would cause
injustice or violate equitable principles. ' ' 2 5 Upon this reasoning the
court concluded that no merger had occurred.
Priority of Liens-The Supreme Court held in Fischer v. Hoyer2 0 6
that where a mortgagee pays real property taxes without notice of
a prior federal tax lien, he acquires a lien superior to the federal
government as the taxes were entitled to the same rank and grade
as the original mortgage. This decision was contrary to numerous
decisions from other jurisdictions which favored the federal lien.20 7
It appears that the approach taken by the Supreme Court is the
203. 130 N.W.2d 76 (N.D. 1964).
204. 120 N.W.2d 13 (N.D. 1963).
205. Small v. Cunningham, 120 N.W.2d 13, 15 (N.D. 1963).
206. 121 N.W.2d 788 (N.D. 1963).




more equitable, as the federal government can easily notify those
who have recorded interests in the property and thereby avoid
having their lien subrogated by the prior mortgagee's payment of
taxes.
Legislative Intent-Where a note and a mortgage payable to a
pledgor were pledged as collateral security for a debt of the pledgor
by endorsement of the note and assignment of the mortgage to the
pledgee, the Supreme Court recently held 208 that the latter became
a redemptioner entitled to redeem the property sold pursuant to
foreclosure of a lien prior to the mortgage as per the Century Code. 20 9
A second case in which the court was called upon to construe
a statute was Bank of Killdeer v. Fettig.2 10 This case held that
section 32-19-07 of the Century Code 211 does not prevent a person
from using either his personal property or his real property or both
as security for a loan. The holder of a note, which is secured by
both a chattel mortgage and a real estate mortgage, is entitled to
foreclose the chattel mortgage without first foreclosing the real
estate mortgage and without reference to the latter.
TORTS
Assumption of the Risk-The question of assumption of the risk
is ordinarily a question of fact to be determined by the jury. It is
only where the evidence is such that reasonable men can draw but
one conclusion therefrom that it becomes a question of law.21 2 A
recent North Dakota case illustrates that the latter statement is not
a hollow utterance.213 In that case the court held that a farm
employee who was well acquainted with the dangers inherent in the
operation of a silage blower, had, as a matter of law, assumed
the risk of injury. This case was followed by another wherein the
defendant appeared to have made out an equally strong claim that
the employee had assumed the risk of injury.2 14 The second case,
like the first, involved a farm employee who had a good knowledge
of operating farm machinery. The jury, however, had found for
the plaintiff. The court in refusing to overturn the jury verdict,
reasoned that although the plaintiff was aware of the danger involved
in the operation of the machine, he may not have been aware of
the full extent of that danger. This indicates that once a jury has
had an opportunity to make a determination the court is very
reluctant to set their verdict aside. It would thus seem that if a
defendant feels that a jury is likely to bring back an unfavorable
208. Mehlhoff v. Pioneer State Bank, 124 N.W.2d 401 (N.D. 1963).
209. N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-24-01,-16 (1960).
210. 129 N.W.2d 365 (N.D. 1964).
211. N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-19-07 (1960).
212. Lusty v. Ostlie, 71 N.W.2d 753 (N.D. 1955).
213. Olstad v. Olstad, 126 N.W.2d 795 (N.D. 1964).
214. Vick v. Panning, 129 N.W.2d 268 (N.D. 1964),
285
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
verdict, notwithstanding his strong case for assumption of the risk,
he had better bank on his motions for summary judgment or directed
verdict 215 rather than hoping to prevail on a motion for a judgment
notwithstanding the verdict.
Assumption of the risk was also raised in another case2 1 6 as
a defense to an action brought under the North Dakota "guest
statute."217 This section of the "guest statute" states that a guest
will not be barred from bringing an action arising out of an auto-
mobile accident if the accident was proximately caused by the
driver's intoxication. The court, relying on a Minnesota decision,2 18
held that the mere fact that the guest had been drinking quite
heavily with the driver prior to the accident did not establish, as a
matter of law, that the guest had assumed the risk of injury.
This holding, which follows the majority rule, again illustrates that
the court is reluctant to enter into the province of the jury.
Contributory Negligence-Two cases with somewhat analagous
fact situations have recently been handed down by the Supreme Court.
In both of these cases the plaintiff was said to be contributorily
negligent. The trial judge in the first case 21 9 had held that the
defendant, a highway department employee, was negligent in driving
his snowplow on the left side of the highway while he was rounding
a curve in the road. He then went on to say that the plaintiff, who
met the snowplow, had properly invoked the emergency doctrine
and thus had not been contributorily negligent when he ran his car
into the ditch rather than attempt to pass the plow on its right.
The Supreme Court hearing the case de novo held that the defendant
had adequate time to slow down and avoid the snowplow; therefore,
the emergency doctrine did not apply. The interesting thing about
this opinion is that the court did not say whether its opinion was
based on a finding that the plaintiff was contributorily negligent
(presupposing negligence on the part of the defendant) or whether
it was based on a determination that the plaintiff's negligence was
the sole and proximate cause of the accident.
The second case 220 dealt with a plaintiff who ran into the rear
of a tractor which was traveling on the highway after dark. The
plaintiff admitted at the trial that he saw the light but he said that
he assumed that it was a "drunk" driving on the wrong side of
the road. Because "drunks" driving on the wrong side of the road
invariably get back into their own lane he did not slow down. Can
you imagine the surprise of the plaintiff when he discovered that
215. But see, N.D.R Cirv. P. 50(a).
216. Sahli v. Fuehrer, 127 N.W.2d 900 (N.D. 1964).
217. N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-15-03 (1960).
218. Statzheim v. DJOs, 256 Minn. 316, 98 N.W.2d 129 (1959).
219. Spielman v. Weber, 118 N.W.2d 727 (N.D. 1962).
220. Mondy v. Gjesdal, 123 N.W.2d 33 (N.D. 1963).
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the "drunk" was not a "drunk" at all but rather a tractor with only
one rear light? The court apparently did not fully appreciate the
plaintiff's chagrin for it found him guilty of contributory negligence
as a matter of law.
Family Purpose Doctrine-When a member of a family is driving
the family car for purposes of recreation or pleasure he is said to
be engaged in the car owner's business and therefore is the owner's
agent. This basically is the family purpose doctrine. It provides
a theory whereby an innocent party to an automobile accident may
recover his damages from the financially responsible car owner
rather than pursuing a remedy against a judgment-proof driver s. 2 2
The doctrine was first adopted in this state by Vannett v. Cole,
2 22
wherein the court, applying the doctrine of respondeat superior,
reasoned that a husband-owner could be held liable for injuries
caused by his wife. Later the court expanded the family purpose
doctrine to include a stranger who had been driving the family car
with the consent of the wife. 223 The court acknowledged, however,
in Michaelson v. Smith2 2 4 that the doctrine is based more on public
policy than it is on logic. They therefore refused to impute the
contributory negligence of a son to his innocent father and allowed
him to recover for the damages to his car. In a recent decision
225
the court reaffirmed the Michaelson case by holding that the alleged
contributory negligence of a wife would not bar her husband's
recovery if he was not present at the accident.
New Trial in Tort Cases-Two tort cases illustrate that the
granting of a new trial lies in the sound discretion of the trial court.
The first of these cases involved the grant of a new trial where the
judge held that the jury award of 300 dollars was insufficient and
not in accordance with the evidence. 226 The Supreme Court, after
a review of the evidence, sustained the trial court's ruling. It pointed
out that the standard applied when determining if a trial judge
abused his discretion in granting a new trial is quite different from
the standard which must be used to determine if he acted properly
in granting a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. In
the former "abuse of discretion" implies an unreasonable, arbitrary
or unconscionable attitude upon the part of the trial court. On the
other hand, to ascertain if the trial judge should have granted the
latter motion, the court must determine if the evidence is such that
reasonable minds can draw but one conclusion therefrom; if not,
there is a question of fact which should be submitted to the jury.
227
221. Ulman v. Lindeman, 44 N.D. 36, 176 N.W. 25 (1919).
222. 41 N.D. 260, 170 N.W. 663 (1918).
223. Ulman v. Lindeman, supra note 221.
224. 113 N.W.2d 571 (N.D. 1962).
225. Brower V. Stolz, 121 N.W.2d 624 (N.D. 1963).
226. Maier v. Holzer, 123 N.W.2d 29 (N.D. 1963).
227. E.g., Leonard v. North Daokta Co-op. Wool Market Ass'n. 72 N.D. 310, 6 N.W.2d
576 (1942).
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
The obvious reason for the difference in standards is that when a
new trial is granted, the matter under litigation is not settled, nor
are any rights terminated, whereas, when a motion for a judgment
notwithstanding the verdict is granted the matter in dispute has
come to a close.
The second case likewise illustrates that considerable weight
will be given to the trial judges determination that a new trial should
be granted. 228 In this case the trial judge ruled that the jury became
confused by the various complaints and cross complaints, thereby
bringing in an unsound verdict. The plaintiff had moved for both
a judgment notwithstanding the verdict and a new trial. It does
not seem unduly speculative to guess that if the trial court had
granted the former rather than the latter the Supreme Court would
have reversed.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
What Constitutes Date of Injury as Concerns Time to File Claim
with the Workmen's Compensation Bureau-North Dakota provides
that all original claims for compensation for disability or death
shall be made within sixty days. 2 9 The problem in Beauchamp v.
North Dakota Workmen's Compensation Bureau2 30 involved a deter-
mination as to the date of injury. The respondent, while employed
as a sandblaster during the summer and fall of 1958, contracted an
occupational disease called silicosis. The disease did not manifest
itself until 1961. At this time, the injured workman filed his claim
for medical expenses with the Workmen's Compensation Bureau.
The Bureau denied his claim on the grounds that the filing was not
made within sixty days as required by the previously mentioned
statute.
On appeal, the Supreme Court following a California decision,
2 1
upheld the District Court in holding that for the purpose of compen-
sation the injury dates from the time when the diseased condition
culminates in an incapacity for work. The court viewed the term
"injury" as a compensable injury and thus agreed with the District
Court that the respondent's claim was made within the proper
statutory time limit.
Proof of Marriage Needed to Recover Widow's Benefits from
Workmen's Compensation Bureau-When a man and woman deport
themselves as husband and wife, a rebuttable presumption arises
that they have entered into a lawful contract of marriage. 2 2 This
228. Meyer v. Robb, 125 N.W.2d 145 (N.D. 1963).
229. N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-0,5-01 (1960).
230. Beauchamp v. North Dakota Workmen's Comp. Bureau, 126 N.W.2d 417 (N.D.
1964).
231. Marsh v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n of Calif., 217 Cal. 338, 18 P.2d 933 (1933).
232. N.D. CENT. CODE § 31-11-01 (1960).
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presumption stands until evidence is found to rebut it. 233 In Fancher
v. North Dakota Workmen's Compensation Bureau, 234 respondent
filed a claim for widow's benefits with the Workmen's Compensation
Bureau. The claim was denied on the grounds that the respondent
failed to establish proof of marriage.
The record divulged testimony from the respondent that a valid
marriage took place, that joint income tax returns were filed, and
that the deed to their home was in both of their names. The only
contradictory evidence consisted of two letters from county officials
where the respondent had alleged she was married. These letters
stated that the county officials could find no record of the alleged
marriage.
The Supreme Court held that no reasonable inference could be
drawn from the letters which conflicted with the testimony given by
the respondent that a marriage was performed and that for fourteen
years respondent and her husband deported themselves as husband
and wife.2
3 5
Admissibility of a Blood Test-Respondent's husband was killed
in a car-truck collision while in the course of employment. A blood
sample was subsequently taken and transferred to a hospital. A
test on the following day showed that the blood contained enough
alcohol to meet the statutory requirements to establish evidence of
intoxication. On the results of this test, the Workmen's Compensation
Bureau denied widow's benefits to the respondent. Evidence dis-
closed that the blood could have been tampered with between the
time it was obtained and the time it was tested. On appeal, the
Supreme Court,2 36 upholding the District Court, held that the test
was inadmissible on two grounds. The first was that the blood was
taken from the body of the decedent after his death in violation of
section 39-20-03 of the Century Code, which provides that death with-
draws one's consent to the taking of a blood test. The second ground
was that when the blood is introduced into evidence to prove
intoxication, it must be shown that it was in substantially the same




It appears that the court gave great weight to the fact that
the blood sample could have been tampered with and called for the
initiation of procedures which would remove any possibility of the
alteration of such a blood sample, if it is to be admitted as evidence.
Receiving of Additional Evidence on Appeal-When a court hears
233. Johnson v. Johnson, 104 N.W.2d 8 (N.D. 1960).
234. Francher v. North Dakota Workmen's Comp. Bureau, 123 N.W.2d 105 (N.D. 1963).
235. Landsrath v. Industrial Ace. Comm'n of Calif., 77 Cal. App. 509, 247 Pac. 227
(1926) ; Svihovec v. Woodsmen Ace. Co., 69 N.D. 259, 285 N.W. 447 (1939).
236. Erickson v. North Dakota Workmen's Comp. Bureau, 123 N.W.2d 292 (N.D. 1963).
237. Gutman v. Industrial Comm'n, 71 Ohio App. 383, 50 N.E.2d 187 (1942).
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an appeal from an administrative agency, without a jury, the
evidence considered by the court must be confined to the record of
the administrative agency.
238
This statutory requirement was applied in Knutson v. North
Dakota Workmen's Compensation Bureau,2 9 a case involving a
workman who was injured in a fall while in the scope of his employ-
ment. After awarding other benefits, the Bureau gave the respondent
a supplemental award for permanent disability to his left arm. The
Bureau resolved that as a result of the injury to his arm, the
respondent was twenty per cent permanently disabled. Evidence
presented for the first time in the District Court revealed that the
respondent was left handed. As a result of this evidence, the District
Court Judge substantially increased the award to respondent.
The Supreme Court held that section 28-32-19 of the Century Code
prohibited District Courts from admitting additional evidence when
hearing an appeal from an administrative agency. The court pointed
out that the District Courts are empowered by section 28-32-18 of
the Century Code to order such additional evidence to be taken,
heard and considered by the Bureau on such terms and conditions
as the court deems proper.
238. N.D. CENT. CODE J 28-32-19 (1960).
239. 120 N.W.2d 880 (N.D. 1963).
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